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RETHINKING AND THEORIZING REGIONAL INTEGRATION
IN SOUTHERN AFRICA
Luwam G. Dirar∗
Regional integration studies is characterized by, and normally understood
as, a combination of inquiries from various disciplines. Conventionally,
integration requires the amalgamation of political and economic policies. Yet,
integration projects transcend political and economic cooperation and might
even require harmonization of laws and principles. Scholars from legal,
economic, and political sciences have studied and engaged in intradisciplinary conceptualization of integration. Some of the theories that
developed in relation to integration schemes in the developed North reflect
socio-economic, political and historical factors of the North, casting doubt on
the applicability, value, and consistency of those theories to integration
schemes in southern Africa. Hence, this article is an attempt to conceptualize
integration through a multidisciplinary analysis in order to proffer a broader
conception of integration that encompasses local and regional emancipation
movements in Africa in general, and in southern African countries in
particular.
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INTRODUCTION
Existing theories of regional integration are characterized by a lack of
consensus. Theorists from different disciplines have attempted to theorize and
conceptualize integration.1 However, most theorists focus on their own
disciplinary inquisition rather than on a comprehensive conceptual framework
for understanding regional integration. The different approaches to
understanding regional integration resulted in the current epistemological
pluralism, which lacking epistemic synergy, led to the correlation between
disciplinary inquiry and the nature and character of the integration scheme.
Conventionally, integration means the amalgamation of political and
economic policies to form a single community. However, theorists will look at
integration differently depending on their discipline. For instance, economists
focus mainly on economic integration or integration schemes that require
economic policy harmonization among member states. Similarly, scholars
engaged in the study of interrelationship between states and co-operating in
peacekeeping activities focus on the effects of integration on regional violence
rather than on other economic or political factors.
Similar to theorists in other disciplines, legal scholars also have a particular
approach to analyzing integration. Legal scholars focus on understanding
coherence, supremacy, and the direct effect of integration law, and assume the
economic and political impacts of integration schemes are already known.
Among legal scholars there is generally a positive appreciation for the effects
of integration on development, even though economic theories show less than
positive results. Many non-legal theorists assume that integration agreements
can apply domestically despite the fact that domestic application of integration
schemes requires a sophisticated discourse involving domestic constitutional
norms and principles based on monist or dualist legal thought. Furthermore,
the lack of horizontal and vertical coherence in regional integration law further
complicates existing domestic application of regional commitments.
Although various disciplines approach integration differently, the existing
integration schemes in Africa, and in southern Africa in particular, cannot be
1

See, e.g., Stanley Hoffmann, Significant Books of the Last 75 Years: Western Europe, FOREIGN AFF.,
Sept./Oct. 1997, at 224, 226–27 (reviewing ERNEST B. HASS, THE UNITING OF EUROPE: POLITICAL, SOCIAL,
AND ECONOMIC FORCES 1950–1957 (1958)) (explaining that Ernest B. Haas is considered one of the first
international relations theorists of European integration schemes); see also C.A. Cooper & B.F. Massel, A New
Look at Customs Union Theory, 75 ECON. J. 742, 742–47 (1965) (discussing economic aspects of regional
integration through customs unions).
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easily categorized as political or economic integration schemes, but rather as a
combination of all approaches.2 In addition, existing theories of integration,
such as the linear integration model, developed in relation to integration
schemes of the developed North took into account the particular historical,
socio-economic, and political factors of that region.3 For this reason, there is
doubt as to the applicability of these schemes in the integration of other
developing countries.4 The question remains then, how to overcome the
existing epistemological pluralism and develop a comprehensive understanding
of regional integration in Africa. Hence, in order to proffer a broader, if not
comprehensive, understanding of integration, this article proposes a
multidisciplinary inquisition that investigates the concept of integration by
using historically sensitive methodologies.
First, to conceptualize regional integration in Africa, and in southern Africa
in particular, this article looks at the views of three prominent African leaders
and founding fathers: Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia,5 Julius Nyerere, first
president of Tanzania,6 and Kwame Nkrumah, first president of Ghana.7 The
2 Article 1 of the Southern African Development Community (“SADC”) Treaty defines “Community”
as “the organisation for economic integration established by Article 2 of [the] Treaty.” Treaty of the Southern
African Development Community art. 1, para. 3, Aug. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 116 [hereinafter SADC Treaty].
Arguably, Article 1 only directs SADC Member States to establish an economic integration scheme and is
otherwise silent on other forms of integration. However, the SADC created an organ on Politics, Defense, and
Security Co-operation and set as the objectives of the organ political integration and regional cooperation in
intrastate and interstate peacekeeping. Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation, Aug. 14, 2001,
http://www.sadc.int/documents-publications/show/809. An additional example of prioritizing integration in
areas not directly related to orthodox economic integration is the Protocol on Mutual Legal Assistance in
Criminal Matters, establishing the framework for the provision of mutual legal assistance in criminal matters
among SADC states. Protocol on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, Oct. 3, 2002, http://www.sadc.
int/documents-publications/show/807. In fact, out of the twenty-two protocols signed by SADC Member
States, only few directly relate to economic and trade policy cooperation. See Protocols, S. AFR. DEV.
COMMUNITY, http://www.sadc.int/index.php/documents-publications/protocols (last visited Mar. 19, 2014).
3 See JAMES THUO GATHII, African Regional Trade Agreements as Flexible Legal Regimes, in AFRICAN
REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS AS LEGAL REGIMES 1 (2011) (comparing African integration schemes with
their counterparts in Europe and North America).
4 Id.
5 See generally HAILE SELLASSIE I, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF EMPEROR HAILE SELASSIE I: ‘MY LIFE AND
ETHIOPIA’S PROGRESS’ 1892–1937 (Edward Ullendorff trans., 1976) (discussing Haile Selassie’s ascent to
power); see also Reidulf Molvaer, My Life and Ethiopia’s Progress Vol. II, 3 NE. AFR. STUD. (n.s.) 149, 149‒
54 (1996) (reviewing and critiquing Haile Selassie’s autobiography); see also Gérard Chaliand, The Horn of
Africa’s Dilemma, FOREIGN POL’Y, Spring 1978, at 116, 117 (discussing the causes of resistance to Haile
Selassie and his overthrow from power, in particular that Haile Selassie, by focusing on modernization of
military, international relations and education, failed to address the needs of eighty-five percent of the
Ethiopian population who were in need of land and economic policy reforms).
6 Madaraka Nyerere, A Short Biography of Julius Nyerere, in AFRICA’S LIBERATION: THE LEGACY OF
NYERERE, at xvi–xvii (Chambi Chachage & Annar Cassam eds., 2010). Julius Nyerere, who was also referred
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views of Nkrumah and Nyerere will help conceptualize integration in Africa,
given that they both represent two of the main blocks of negotiation for unity
in post-colonial Africa.8 However, reference to Selassie as an African
integration thinker might appear contentious. Selassie’s persistent claim of
how his Ethiopian kingdom is a continuation of Kingdom of Judah makes him
more Zionist than Africanist. Nevertheless, discussions during the formative
years of African unity show that Selassie’s views are an intermediary between
the views of Nkrumah and Nyerere. His persistent call for unity without regard
to different approaches emphasized “unity” as solidarity, even more than
“unity” as integration.9
Second, this Article challenges classical theories and justifications of
regional integration and their applicability in the southern African context.10
Unlike the classical justification for integration in Europe, the main
justification for integration in post-colonial Africa is emancipation from racial
to as Mwalimwu, was elected to the head of the Tanganyika African National Party in 1954, began holding a
parliamentary position in 1958, and successfully led Tanganyika to independence from British colonization.
Tanganyika Republic Act, 1962, 11 Eliz. 2, c. 1 (U.K.). In 1964, Nyerere managed to unite Zanzibar and
Tanganyika, leading to the formation of the United Republic of Tanzania. An Act to Ratify the Articles of
Union Between Tanganyika and Zanzibar, Act No. 22 of 1964 (1964); see also Bonny Ibhawoh & J.I. Dibua,
Deconstructing Ujamaa: The Legacy of Julius Nyerere in the Quest for Social and Economic Development in
Africa, 8 AFR. J. POL. SCI. 59, 60–78 (2003). Nyerere is remembered for the introduction of Ujamaa, a
philosophy of development grounded in rural socialization, and oriented toward distributive justice and social
equity. Id. at 62. Unlike the conventional understanding of socialism, the basis of which is class struggle, for
Nyerere the basis of African socialism rests on African values. Id. For him the ideal society is characterized by
freedom, equality and unity. Id. His enforcement of Ujamaa through coercion was nevertheless self-defeating
and contrary to his conception of ideal society. Id. at 67. Even though the Ujamaa development plan failed to
achieve economic development, it did solidify a sense of nationalism beyond the realms of ethnicity and
family identity in Tanzania. Id. at 71. See Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere, Ujamaa: The Basis of African
Socialism, 1 J. PAN AFR. STUD. 1, 4–11 (1987), for an explanation of Nyerere’s conception of African
socialism.
7 See DAVID BIRMINGHAM, KWAME NKRUMAH: THE FATHER OF AFRICAN NATIONALISM 4–6 (rev. ed.
1998). Nkrumah. Nkrumah trained at Lincoln University and was influenced by great Pan-Africanism theorists
like Du Bois and Marcus Garvey. See id.; Kwadwo Afari-Gyan, Kwame Nkrumah, George Padmore and
W.E.B. Du Bois, 7 INST. AFR. STUD. RES. REV. 1 (1991). Nkrumah was a socialist and was acclaimed for
leading Ghana to independence in 1957. See BIRMINGHAM, supra. Nkrumah renamed himself “Osagyefo,”
meaning “Redeemer,” but his imposition of one party rule and other restrictions led to the dissatisfaction of
many Ghanaians and his eventual overthrow in 1966. See Jonathan Zimmerman, The Ghost of Kwame
Nkrumah Zimbabwe and Africa, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Apr. 24, 2008, at 8.
8 See Mohabe Nyirabu, Feature, Appraising Regional Integration in Southern Africa, 13 AFR. SECURITY
REV., no. 1, 2004, at 21, 21‒22 (comparing Nkrumah’s and Nyerere’s integration models).
9 See Haile Selassie, Emperor of Ethiopia, Address at the 1963 African Summit (May 23, 1963), in U.N.
ECON. COMM’N FOR AFR., CELEBRATING SUCCESS: AFRICA’S VOICE OVER 50 YEARS 1963–2013, at 2, (2013)
[hereinafter Selassie Address].
10 By classical theories of integration, the author is referring to the economic and political justifications
for integration.
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domination and colonial rule.11 With the end of apartheid rule and the
independence of all African states, the common need for political emancipation
has become less imperative.12 The question then remains: Has integration
ended with the end of apartheid? More specifically, has there been a
transformation in how integration is understood, and is integration sought only
for conventional justifications like the economic and political reasons given in
case of the European Union?13 By asking these questions and others, this
article is a critical attempt to move toward a multidisciplinary
reconceptualization of integration in Africa, and in southern African countries
in particular. In conclusion, this Article intends to bring both theoretical and
conceptual synergy by re-conceptualizing “integration as emancipation”
among southern African states.
I. PAN-AFRICAN CONCEPTION OF INTEGRATION
This Part of the Article analyzes the ideas of African political thinkers
regarding regional integration in order to proffer answers for understanding
integration in the continent. Understanding the views of Selassie, Nkrumah,
and Nyerere (referred to in this Article as the “founding fathers”),14 leads to a
sophisticated discourse of regional integration that allows one to assess the
conceptual understanding of integration, or the lack thereof, by exploring the
intent of the founding fathers. The dominant understanding among postcolonial African thinkers was that there was a shared enthusiasm for
integration.15 All the states represented in the formative years of the
11

See Selassie Address, supra note 9, at 1–2.
In this part, the use of the phrase, “political emancipation” is limited to the independence of African
states from colonization and the freedom of Africans from racial domination by colonial settlers. However,
expansions of the emancipation project to new post-independence emancipation projects of Africa, for instance
minority rights movements, is advocated and argued for in the last part of this Article.
13 The main justification for the origins of the EU in the 1950s is the creation of peaceful co-existence
and economic development and prosperity among member states. See Robert Schuman, French Minister of
Foreign Affairs, Declaration of 9 May 1950, in EUR. PARLIAMENT, 60TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE SCHUMAN
DECLARATION 1950–2010: THE 9TH OF MAY SCHUMAN DECLARATION: HISTORICAL CONTEXT AND MAIN
ACTORS 33 (2010).
14 The call for African Unity can be traced back to Marcus Garvey, Henry Sylvester-Williams, W.E.B Du
Bois and other Pan-Africanist thinkers outside the African continent, and while Nkrumah was an active
member of the Pan-Africanism movement in the 1940s, the same cannot be said with regard to Nyerere and
Haile Selassie. See Afari-Gyan, supra note 7, at 1–2. Nevertheless, this Article will focus the discussion of
Pan-Africanism on when it took continental dimension, specifically with the call for African unity by the heads
of African states.
15 See, e.g., Gamal Abdel Nasser, President of the United Arab Republic, Address at the 1963 African
Summit (May 23, 1963), in CELEBRATING SUCCESS: AFRICA’S VOICE OVER 50 YEARS 1963–2013, supra note
9, at 110 (analogizing between the birth and survival of an individual and unity of African continent); see also,
12
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Organization of African Unity (“OAU”) supported African integration.16 In
conclusion, this Part argues that African thinkers, in the formative years of
African unity, did not have an agreed upon conception of regional integration;
yet, they all believed that integration led and solidified the continental
emancipation project.
A. Founding Fathers: African Unity or African Solidarity
The founding fathers acknowledged the existence of different approaches
to integration and were divided on which approach to adopt. Nkrumah
advocated for a federal approach, with vertical central authority and
supranational authority over member states.17 On the other hand, Nyerere
promoted a more gradual and intergovernmental confederal approach that
enabled member states to retain most of their sovereign power.18 On the
contrary, Selassie represented a centralist view that neither advocated for
federalism or confederalism, but rather advocated for an agreement that
showed that Africans stand united.19 For him the difference was one of
David Dacko, President of the Cent. Afr. Rep., Address at the 1963 African Summit (May 23, 1963), in
CELEBRATING SUCCESS: AFRICA’S VOICE OVER 50 YEARS 1963–2013, supra note 9, at 16 (explaining that the
existence of the Central African Republic would be in danger if it were to stand by itself); Sekou Toure,
President of Guinea, Address at the 1963 African Summit (May 23, 1963), in CELEBRATING SUCCESS:
AFRICA’S VOICE OVER 50 YEARS 1963–2013, supra note 9, at 42–43 (stating that African Unity was an effort
to correct the arbitrary actions of colonist in the scramble for Africa). Partly because of those reasons and other
similar justifications, all states represented were in agreement of the need for integration.
16 The 1963 Conference of Heads of African States and Governments led to the creation of the
Organization of African Unity (“OAU”). Thirty-two African states were represented at the conference and
expressed their interest and support for African integration. Those countries were: Algeria, Burundi,
Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Leopoldville), Dahomey, Ethiopia,
Gabon, Ghana, Guinea (Conakry), Ivory Coast, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco,
Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tanganyika (Tanzania), Togo, Tunisia,
Uganda, United Arab Republic (Egypt), and Republic of Upper Volta (Burkina Faso). Charter of the
Organization of African Unity, May 25, 1963, 479 U.N.T.S. 39.
17 See Kwame Nkrumah, President. of Ghana, Address at the 1963 African Summit (May 23, 1963), in
CELEBRATING SUCCESS: AFRICA’S VOICE OVER 50 YEARS 1963–2013, supra note 9, at 37–39 [hereinafter
Nkrumah Address].
18 See Julius K. Nyerere, Pres., Tanganyika, Address at the 1963 African Summit (May 23, 1963), in
CELEBRATING SUCCESS: AFRICA’S VOICE OVER 50 YEARS 1963–2013, supra note 9, at 101 [hereinafter
Nyerere Address].
19 Selassie Address, supra note 9, at 2–3 (emphasizing an agreement that unites Africa without actually
focusing on one approach to integration). For some, African Unity was a Negro superiority project that sought
to achieve and maintain African equality with Europe:
There has been, in the language of African unification, the implied assumption that even if a
united Africa, materially on a level with a divided Europe, did not prove equality in technological
capacities, it would at least have established African superiority in terms that can almost be
described as ‘ethical.’ The (Nigerian) Action Group Policy Paper on a West African Union issued
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semantics.20 In his words, “no clear consensus exists on the ‘how’ and the
‘what’ of this union, it is to be, in form, federal, confederal or unitary? Is the
sovereignty of individual states to be reduced, and if so, by how much, and in
what areas?”21 Selassie noted that all integration approaches have a common
central objective of unity—a unity that symbolizes strength and facilitates the
independence of all African people.22 He noted that a united Africa would have
more chances of transitioning from its colonial history to active participation in
world affairs.23 He envisioned Africa free from colonization and racial
discrimination. In his words:
Africa’s victory, although proclaimed, is not yet total, and areas of
resistance still remain. . . . Our liberty is meaningless unless all
Africans are free. Our brothers in the Rhodesia, in Mozambique, in
Angola, in South Africa cry out in anguish for our support and
24
assistance.

For Selassie, the primary goal of integration was to secure independence
for all Africans.25 Although, he envisioned political union as the ultimate goal
of unity, he noted the importance of social and economic cooperation to
strengthen political unity.26 In contrast, Nkrumah argued that political
in 1960 could thus view the creation of such a Union as a means by which Africans were to prove
to the world that ‘Negro states, though the last to come, are the first to use their brains for the
conquest of the forces that have kept men apart.’ Such Negro states were to have been almost the
first multi-lingual sovereign states willingly to renounce their sovereignty for the unity of at least
one group of peoples. To that extent they would have established superiority over a Europe
which, in recent times, had had two enormously costly civil wars—a Europe which still remained
in acute competition both within itself and in the advantages each little segment of Europe sought
from the outside world.
Ali A. Mazrui, African Attitudes to the European Economic Community, 39 INT’L AFF. 24, 25 (1963) (footnote
omitted). The question remains though, now that Europe is an epitome of regional integration in contemporary
integration studies, what drives African integration? Additionally, despite the multiple promises, speeches and
agreements for continental integration, Africa is still divided fifty years later and in quest of deeper integration.
The fair conclusion is, therefore, that the idea of “Negro superiority” no longer serves as a justification for
African integration following the formation of European Union.
20 Selassie Address, supra note 9, at 2 (“[T]hrough all that has been said and written and done in these
years, there runs a common theme. Unity is the accepted goal. We argue about techniques and tactics. But
when semantics are stripped away, [t]here is little argument among us. We are determined to create a union of
Africans.”).
21 Id. at 3.
22 See id. at 2.
23 Id. at 1 (“Africa is today at mid-course, in transition from the Africa of yesterday to the Africa of
[t]omorrow.”).
24 Id. at 2.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 4.
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integration was of vital and primal importance for Africa’s development.27 In
his words, “African Unity is, above all, a political kingdom which can only be
gained by political means. The social and economic development of Africa
will come only within the political kingdom, not the other way round.”28 For
Nkrumah, the justifications for Africa’s integration were not limited to the
liberation of African people, but also included its impact on attracting foreign
investment and peaceful coexistence.29 For Nkrumah, unity was not an option
but a necessity based on cooperation in defense, foreign affairs, diplomacy,
common citizenship, and African economic and monetary integration.30
Nkrumah refuted Nyerere’s confederal approach to integration, labeling it as
balkanization that was susceptible to the promotion of neo-colonialist
agendas.31 For Nkrumah, Nyerere’s proposal for gradual integration ignored
the interrelationship and mutuality of the problems facing African states.32 To
the contrary, Nyerere argued that just as liberation of Africa is gradual, so is its
unity.33 For Nyerere, gradual integration secured free agreement and
consensual unionization.34

27

Nkrumah Address, supra note 17, at 35.
Id.
29 Id. at 37 (describing the effect of the formation of OAU on peace in the continent). “The masses of the
people of Africa are crying for unity. The people of Africa call for the breaking down of the boundaries that
[kept] them apart. They demand an end to the border disputes between sister African states—disputes that arise
out of artificial barriers that divided us. It was colonialism’s purpose that left us with our border irredentism,
that rejected our ethnic and cultural fusion.” Id.; see also Ama Biney, The Legacy of Kwame Nkrumah in
Retrospect, J. PAN AFR. STUD., Mar. 2008, at 129, 136 (discussing how Nkrumah thought that regional
integration is a prerequisite for the elimination of neo-colonialism).
30 See Nkrumah Address, supra note 17, at 38 (“Unite we must. Without necessarily sacrificing our
sovereignties, big or small, we can here and now forge a political union based on Defense, Foreign Affairs and
Diplomacy, and a Common Citizenship, an African Currency, an African Monetary Zone and an African
Central Bank. We must unite in order to achieve the full liberation of our continent. We need a Common
Defense System with an African High Command to ensure the stability and security of Africa.”).
31 Id. at 39 (“It is this popular determination that must move us on to a Union of Independent African
States. In delay lies danger to our well-being, to our very existence as free states. It has been suggested that our
approach to unity should be gradual, that it should go piece-meal. This point of view conceives of Africa as a
static entity with ‘frozen’ problems which can be eliminated one by one and when all have been cleared then
we can come together and say: ‘Now all is well. Let us unite.’ This view takes no account of the impact of
external pressures. Nor does it take cognisance of the danger that delay can deepen our isolations and
exclusiveness; that it can enlarge our differences and set us drifting further and further apart into the net of
neo-colonialism, so that our union will become nothing but a fading hope, and the great design of Africa’s full
redemption will be lost, perhaps, forever.”).
32 Id. at 36–37.
33 Nyerere Address, supra note 18, at 101.
34 Id. (“We are therefore left with only one method of bringing about African unity. That method is the
method of free agreement. That is why at the beginning of this speech I said our task is to discover how to
bring about our freedom in unity and our unity in freedom.”).
28
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Examining the thoughts of the founding fathers demonstrates that their
focus was on unity. However, the founding fathers were vague in their
definition of unity. Ambiguity exists as to what unity actually is, or should be.
For one, unity can be used interchangeably with integration, meaning the
“process of making a whole.”35 Second, unity can mean to act in concert
against a common enemy.36 There is no doubt that the founding fathers defined
unity as acting together for liberation of all Africans; however, the question
then remains whether they meant unity to also include integration.37
The ambiguity of the use of “unity” as both solidarity and as integration
reflects the lack of conceptual clarity in the formative years of the OAU. The
OAU Charter consistently used words such as “unity,” “solidarity,” and
“cooperation” interchangeably without actually defining them.38 When the
OAU was transformed to the African Union (AU), the ambiguity surrounding
use of the word “unity” continued and the duality still exists today.39
The dual meaning of the word “unity” is also manifest in sub-regional
integration efforts on the continent.40 Solidarity, and other concepts such as
human rights, democracy, and rule of law, are principles of the Southern
African Development Community (“SADC”) and its member states.41 These
principles, with the aim of forging integration, theoretically guide the actions
35 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 880 (9th ed. 2011) (defining integration as “the process of making whole
or combining into one”).
36 Id. at 1676 (defining unity as “jointness of interest”).
37 Nyerere Address, supra note 18. For Nyerere, all of the African states had a common stance, or
solidarity, against colonization. Id. That is to say, to Nyerere, unity meant solidarity. Nevertheless, he also
made it clear that unity also meant integration. Id. However, it is also evident that solidarity and integration
were understood as mutually interdependent concepts among the founding fathers. Id.
38 Charter of the Organization of African Unity art II, May 25, 1963, 479 U.N.T.S. 79. The OAU Charter
in general, but particularly Article II, never uses the term “integration.” See id.
39 Constitutive Act of the African Union art. 3, adopted July 11, 2000, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/23.15
(“The objectives of the Union shall be to . . . achieve greater unity and solidarity between the African counties
and the peoples of Africa . . . [and to] accelerate the political and socio-economic integration of the
continent.”).
40 See generally, e.g., SADC Treaty, supra note 2. Historically SADC was formed to end political and
economic domination by then-apartheid South Africa. See SADC Profile, AFR. UNION,
www.au.int/en/recs/sadc (last visited Mar. 28, 2014). One of the reasons for the inclusion of Article 6(2) of the
SADC Treaty was to end racial domination. See SADC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 6(2) (“SADC and Member
States shall not discriminate against any person on grounds of gender, religion, political views, race, ethnic
origin, culture, or disability.”).
41 See SADC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 4 (“SADC and its Member States shall act in accordance with the
following principles: a) sovereign equality of all Member States; b) solidarity, peace and security; c) human
rights, democracy, and the rule of law; d) equity, balance and mutual benefit; e) peaceful settlement of
disputes.”).
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of SADC Member States.42 However, the SADC Treaty provides neither a
mechanism, nor guidance, on how to interpret the principles of the
organization. Hypothetically speaking, all the principles enumerated under
Article 4 of SADC Treaty are equal and carry the same weight. There is little
doubt that the drafters of the SADC Treaty did not envisage the possibility of
contradiction between the different principles. Nevertheless, the way SADC
states have reacted to Zimbabwe’s refusal to abide by the SADC Tribunal’s
decisions reflects the fact that SADC Member States prioritize solidarity over
other principles of the organization.43 Unlike the interpretation of solidarity in
the 1960s, which then meant emancipation of all Africans,44 the behavior of
the SADC member states demonstrates an alternative interpretation of
solidarity to mean standing together in support of the actions of member state
governments, even if doing so violates the emancipation project.
II. CLASSICAL ECONOMIC THEORIES OF INTEGRATION
Along the same lines as the Washington Consensus, the neo-liberal
economic theory of development argues that trade liberalization leads to
economic growth.45 It promotes regional economic integration as a plan B to

42 SADC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 6(1) (“Member States undertake to adopt adequate measures to
promote the achievement of the objectives of SADC, and shall refrain from taking any measure likely to
jeopardise the sustenance of its principles, the achievement of its objectives and the implementation of the
provisions of this Treaty.”).
43 See, e.g., Solomon T. Ebobrah, Human Rights Developments in Sub-Regional Courts in Africa During
2008, 9 AFR. HUM. RTS. L.J. 312, 334–35 (2009) (discussing SADC Tribunal’s decision on Zimbabwe as an
example of human rights prevailing over oppression, although Zimbabwe failed to abide by the Tribunal’s
decisions); see also Amos Saurombe, An Analysis and Exposition of Dispute Settlement Forum Shopping for
SADC Member States in the Light of the Suspension of the SADC Tribunal, 23 S.H. AFR. MER. L.J. 392, 392‒
406 (2011) (discussing suspension of SADC Tribunal).
44 See generally Saurombe, supra note 43.
45 Olugbenga A. Onafowora & Oluwole Owoye, Can Trade Liberalization Stimulate Economic Growth
in Africa?, 26 WORLD DEV. 497, 501–05 (1998) (arguing that trade liberalization directly correlates with
economic growth and exploring the relationship between growth, trade policies, and investment in twelve subSaharan African countries). See also Michael J. Trebilcock, Critiquing the Critics of Economic Globalization
11‒12 (Jan. 20, 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://iilj.org/courses/documents/HC2005.
Trebilcock.EconGlobal.pdf, for an analysis of how open economies tend to grow larger and faster than closed
economies. Trebilcock argues that global inequalities are more a failure of domestic policies rather than a
failure of globalization. Id. He argues that income inequalities at the country level today are much higher than
global inequalities and, therefore, it is really the failure of domestic government policies that do not mandate
redistribution of wealth between the haves and have-nots. Id; accord MARIAN L. TUPY, CATO INST., POLICY
ANALYSIS NO. 557, TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND POVERTY REDUCTION IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 4–5 (2005).
But see Frank Ackerman & Kevin P. Gallagher, The Shrinking Gains from Global Trade Liberalization in
Computable General Equilibrium Models: A Critical Assessment, 37 INT’L J. POL. ECON. 50, 50‒51 (2008)
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unilateral tariff reduction.46 This theory based on the assumption that unilateral
tariff reduction increases competition, argues a causal link between
liberalization and trade creation.47 Since states are not willing to unilaterally
reduce or eliminate tariffs, the classical approach then encourages states to
prefer the discriminatory elimination of tariffs.48 At the multilateral level, the
World Trade Organization (“WTO”) is case in point where states engage to
eliminate tariffs and non-tariff barriers discriminatorily to non-member
states.49 At the regional level, several states have formed regional and subregional integration schemes that discriminate against foreign products.50
Contrary to unilateral tariff reduction, Jacob Viner, an economist, advances
a theory on customs union that argues that discriminatory tariff reduction can
have a trade creation and/or diversion effect.51 For Viner, ambiguities in the
welfare impact of customs unions are related to the capacity and limitations of

(discussing how mainstream economic models are flawed and unable to accurately predict the impact of trade
liberalization).
46 MARTIN RICHARDSON, UNIV. OF OTAGO, ECONOMICS DISCUSSION PAPERS NO. 0102, UNILATERAL
LIBERALISATION IN A MULTILATERAL WORLD 2 (2001). The defining factor in unilateral tariff reduction is its
lack of reciprocal tariff-reduction requirements. Id. Unilateral tariff reduction can have other conditions
attached to it. Id. For example, tariff reduction can be tied to loan forgiveness. Id.
47 ANTHONY P. THIRLWALL, AFR. DEV. BANK, ECON. RESEARCH PAPERS NO. 63, TRADE, TRADE
LIBERALISATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: THEORY AND EVIDENCE 14 (2000). The trade creation effect of a
particular tariff elimination policy is determined by its impact on trade costs. If country A has no tariffs at all
on exporting product Z and produces Z at a cost of X. Country B produces product Z at a cost of X but charges
export tariff of T. The cost of Z in the global market is cost of production plus profit (P). Both states have a
fixed profit of P. The cost of product Z will be X+P in country A and X+P in country B. The cost of importing
product Z from country A is just X+P while that of country B is X+P+T. Assuming all other variables are static
importers from country C will rationally import product Z from country A. Therefore, unilateral tariff
elimination by country A on product Z has led to more trade for country A than country B.
48 See Richard E. Baldwin & Anthony J. Venables, Regional Economic Integration, in 3 HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 1597, 1598 (G. Grossman & K. Rogoff eds., 1995) (2003) (discussing how
Europe and North America have managed to liberalize their regional trade substantially more than the global
trade liberalization project).
49 Principles of the Trading System, WTO, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact2_e.
htm (last visited May 2, 2014).
50 Cf. List of all RTAs, WTO, http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicAllRTAList.aspx (last visited Mar. 20, 2014).
Since 1995, more than 300 regional integration schemes have been brought to the attention of the WTO. Id.
51 C.A. Cooper & B.F. Massell, A New Look at Customs Union Theory, 75 ECON. J. 742, 742 (1965)
(discussing how Viner’s theory of customs unions explains the trade creation and diversion effect of a
preferential trade arrangement). For Viner, trade diversion, which negatively affects welfare of the home state,
is a shift from a “high-cost domestic” producer to a “low-cost foreign producer,” which could alternatively be
called outsourcing of production. Id. On the other hand, trade creation by insourcing foreign production
increases welfare of the home state at the disadvantage of the foreign state. Id; see also JACOB VINER, THE
CUSTOMS UNION ISSUE (1950); Jagdish Bhagwati & Arvind Panagariya, The Theory of Preferential Trade
Agreements: Historical Evolution and Current Trends, 86 AMER. ECON. REV. 82, 82 (1996).
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members to define their own external trade policy.52 The net static effect of
regional integration is positive if the formation of the integration scheme has a
net trade creation effect.53 However, static welfare analysis assumes that the
respective Member States of the integration scheme are complementary.54
Applying Viner’s theory on regional integration schemes to Africa, and SADC
in particular, has led to ambiguous results, partly because of low intra-regional
trade.55

Table 2.2.1-Intra-REC Import (Im.) and Exports (Ex.) (2003–2007) in US ($)
millions.56

Conventionally, trade integration is measured by the level of intra-regional
trade among member states.57 Using transaction data as the sole measure of
integration and its impact is deeply flawed. For one, the relationship between
intraregional trade and growth is contestable. Trade integration is associated
with four freedoms: (1) goods, (2) services, (3) capital, and (4) people.58
Depending on the degree of integration, the freedoms guaranteed in the
integration schemes can extend from trade liberalization that guarantees free
movement of goods to trade liberalization that guarantees free movement of
52

See generally VINER, supra note 51.
Baldwin & Venables, supra note 48, at 1605 (discussing how James Meade, a British economist,
building on Viner’s theory, argued that if all external trade barriers are fixed and unchanging, static markets,
regional integration agreement has a positive correlation to welfare of member states).
54 Jozef M. Van Brabant, Economic Integration Among Developing Countries Toward a New Paradigm,
in ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN AFRICA 31, 33 (Naceur Bourenane ed., 1996)
(discussing the reasons for low intraregional trade in African integration schemes, one of which is the lack of
complementarities to modes of production in the continent).
55 See, e.g., DAVID EVANS ET AL., SADC: THE COST OF NON-INTEGRATION 4‒5, (1999); see also ECON.
COMM’N FOR AFR., ECA POLICY RESEARCH REPORT, ASSESSING REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN AFRICA I, at 16
(2004) [hereinafter UNECA I] (estimating that the net gain from integration in the SADC will result in a one
percent increase in GDP, while other economists have predicted either no effect, or a negative effect, of
integration).
56 ECON. COMM’N FOR AFR., ECA POLICY RESEARCH REPORT, ASSESSING REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN
AFRICA IV, at 77, 82 (2010) [hereinafter UNECA IV]. The information in the chart was extracted from two
different tables. See id.
57 UNECA I, supra note 55, at 277.
58 Background, EUR. FREE TRADE ASS’N, http://www.efta.int/eea/eu-programmes/application-finances/
background (last visited Mar. 28, 2014).
53
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people. Goods transactions are the easiest to quantify among the four
freedoms. Nevertheless, existing data on the flow of goods in African
integration schemes does not encompass transaction of goods performed under
the rubric of the informal sector. For instance, the informal sector constitutes
twenty to ninety percent of the national economy of the west African states.59
This critique of lack of comprehensiveness of existent transaction or trade flow
data in Africa is a clear example of what Shanta Devarajan, the World Bank’s
chief economist for Africa, calls it “a statistical tragedy.”60 Furthermore, it is a
logical expectation for intra-regional imports and exports to be of equal value.
An analysis of existing intraregional transactions, as specified in Table 2.2.1,
shows that intraregional imports do not match intraregional exports. For
instance, according to available data of the year from 2007, intraregional
exports among SADC states were $11,678 million in value, while intraregional
imports amounted to $12,802 million.61 Therefore, according to existing data,
the SADC as a region has a deficit. Statistically, it is possible for the SADC, or
any other regional integration scheme, to show trade deficit or surplus with
other trading partners, as shown in Table 2.2.2. However, no adequate
explanation, other than the continent’s “statistical tragedy” has been extended
to explain the data in intraregional trade deficit of SADC.

Table 2.2.2-REC’s average exports and imports (2000–2007) to select trading
62
partners in US ($)

Viner’s theory was further developed by other economists, the latest being
Baldwin whom extended classical theory of customs union to markets with
imperfect competitions.63 Baldwin’s framework of welfare analysis looks at
allocation, accumulation, and location effects of regional integration schemes

59

UNECA IV, supra note 56, at 143.
See Nico Colombant, New Research Confronts Africa’s ‘Statistical Tragedy,’ VOICE OF AM. (Dec. 5,
2011),
http://www.voanews.com/content/new-research-confronts-africas-statistical-tragedy-135134213/
159278.html.
61 UNECA IV, supra note 56, at 77, 82.
62 Id. at 77, 80–83.
63 See Baldwin & Venables, supra note 48, at 1601–02.
60
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in imperfect markets.64 First, the allocation effect argues that formation of
regional integration increases resource allocation.65 This argument centers
around the inverted relationship between protectionism and its impact on
efficiency.66 Moreover, regional integration has a variety effect and gives
consumers choice of product quality and price.67 Second, the accumulation
effect argues that formation of regional integration schemes has a positive
effect on economic growth as it increases both factor and knowledge
accumulation.68 Third, the location effect argues that market size affects
investor’s decisions of whether to invest.69 Hence, investors are prone to invest
in bigger markets formed under integration schemes than to invest in single
state with smaller market size.

Angola
Botswana
DRC
Lesotho
Madagascar
Malawi
Mauritius
Mozambique
Namibia
Seychelles
South Africa
Swaziland
Tanzania
Zambia
Zimbabwe

FDI Inflows
2004
1449
392
10
53
95
22
14
245
226
38
799
71
331
364
9

2005
-1303
281
-79
57
86
27
42
108
348
86
6251
-50
448
380
103

2006
-1140
274
180
57
230
30
105
154
327
146
-323
36
377
350
40

FDI Outflows
2004
2005
35
219
-29
56
2
1
32
48
-22
-13
8
7
1352
930
-1
-24
1

2006
93
21
1
10
-12
8
6674
2
-

Table 2.2.3. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) flows 2004-2006 to SADC Member
70
States in US ($) millions.
64 Id. Baldwin categorizes the trade effects of formation of integration schemes and analyzes it under
both perfect and imperfect competition. The formation of regional integration has the output, variety and scale
effects. Id.
65 U.N. Conference on Trade & Dev., Economic Development in Africa: Strengthening Regional
Economic Integration for Africa’s Development, at 5, UNCTAD/ALDC/AFRICA/2009, U.N. Sales No.
E.09.II.D.7 (2009) [hereinafter UNCTAD 2009].
66 Id. at 7 (discussing how import substitution policies of several African countries resulted to protection
of inefficient industries).
67 Id. at 6.
68 Id. (discussing relationship between investment flows and regional integration).
69 Id.
70 U.N. Conference on Trade & Dev., World Investment Report: Transnational Corporations, Extractive
Industries and Development, at 252, U.N. Sales No. E.09.II.D.7 (2007) [hereinafter UNCTAD 2007].
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When looking at FDI flows in the SADC region, one might wonder if
regional integration has had an impact in FDI inflow to Member States. As
shown in Table 2.2.3, Angola is the highest recipient of FDI inflow among all
SADC Member States.71 Malawi, on the other hand, is the lowest recipient of
FDI inflow in the year 2006.72 Malawi is more representative of the entire
continent of Africa, which has not been a major recipient of foreign direct
investment (FDI).73 For instance, in the years 1999 through 2000, Africa’s
share of FDI inflow was 0.8 percent, putting the continent at the bottom of the
list.74 Only six years later in 2006, Africa’s FDI inflow tripled and reached 2.7
percent of global FDI inflow.75 This surge in FDI inflow is not a result of deep
integration in the continent but rather of the quest for oil and other natural
resources.76 In addition to Angola, which is the major oil exporter in the
region, other mineral-producing countries among southern African states (e.g.,
Mauritius, Lesotho, Swaziland, Tanzania and Zambia) received larger inflows
of FDI.77 Therefore, the liberal claim of the relationship between regional
integration and FDI inflow, at least as it pertains to Sub-Saharan Africa, lacks
empirical foundation. However, the success of African integration cannot be
measured only by low intraregional trade or FDI inflow, but rather must also
be based on what the founding fathers imagined could be achieved through
integration.
III. KANTIAN THEORY OF PERPETUAL PEACE AND AFRICAN REGIONAL
INTEGRATION
Earlier peace theorists predominantly focused on the importance of
maintaining homogeneous religious values for peaceful coexistence of the
international system.78 Without instilling less tolerance to different religions,
71

Id.
Id.
73 Chantal Dupasquier & Patrick N. Osakwe, Foreign Direct Investment in Africa: Performance,
Challenges and Responsibilities 6 (Econ. Comm’n for Afr., Afr. Trade Ctr., Working Paper No. 21, 2005)
(discussing recent trends in Foreign Direct Investment).
74 Id.
75 UNCTAD 2007, supra note 70, at xvii.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 74 & n.5 (discussing FDI inflow increase to specific countries with extractive resources).
78 IMMANUEL KANT, PERPETUAL PEACE 4‒6 (M. Campbell Smith trans., 3rd ed., 1917) (1795) (noting
that “for the barbarian, war is the rule; peace the exception. His gods, like those of Greece, are war-like gods;
his spirit, at death, flees to some Valhalla. For him life is one long battle; his arms go with him even to the
grave. Food and the means of existence he seeks through plunder and violence” and suggesting that what
brought about the formation of states is a conscious necessity of forming a united front in the battlefield). This
institution, the state, changed character of warfare into a systematic war of one nation against another nation
72
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peaceful coexistence meant that a particular society or societies had to practice
the same religion.79 In a way, religion has a dual impact of peace and war.80
Today, with the development of modern society, characterized by
rationalization, the world has become what Max Weber called
“disenchanted”81 and theorists have focused on integration as a means to end
future wars.82
Immanuel Kant’s analysis of the covenant of peace, foedus pacificum,83 is
one of the earliest works that dealt with the correlation between integration and
peace without instilling religion into the dynamic of peaceful coexistence.84
For Kant, formation of a federation of states is one of three definitive articles
for perpetual peace.85 He reasoned that peace treaties might end current wars
but was not able to transform ancient world, of perpetual warfare, to perpetual peace. See generally Chadwick
F. Alger, Religion as a Peace Tool, 1 GLOBAL REV. ETHNOPOLITICS 94, 94 (2002) (analyzing religion as a
peacemaking tool).
79 See Charles J. Halperin, The Ideology of Silence: Prejudice and Pragmatism on the Medieval Religious
Frontier, 26 COMP. STUD. IN SOC’Y & HIST. 442, 442 (1984) (explaining how religious animosity was the
central cause and basis for crusade and jihad and war among Christians and Muslims).
80 See JONATHAN FOX, THE MULTIPLE IMPACTS OF RELIGION ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS:
PERCEPTIONS AND REALITY 7 (2006), available at http://www.ifri.org/files/politique_etrangere/4_2006_Fox.
pdf.
81 Max Weber, Science as a Vocation, Speech at Munich University (1918), in FROM MAX WEBER:
ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 155 (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds., 2005) (“The fate of our times is characterized
by rationalization and intellectualization and, above all, by the ‘disenchantment of the world.”). Max Weber’s
choice of word of disenchanted rather than secularization is an interesting choice. Disenchantment is the
privatization of religious beliefs rather than full abandonment of once faith. See id.
82 Note that the arguments above are not meant to imply that “religion” has lost its relevance as a peace
or war tool. Rather, the argument is that the world has become more “disenchanted.”
83 Foedus pacificum is made of two Latin terminologies. Foedus means “league” or “treaty.” See
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 716 (9th ed., 2009). Pacificum means “peaceful.”
84 See Patrick Riley, The Abbé De St. Pierre and Voltaire on Perpetual Peace in Europe, 137 WORLD
AFF. 186, 186 (1975) (discussing how the Project for Perpetual Peace (Abbe’ de St. Pierre’s Project) is
considered a comprehensive plan for perpetual peace in Europe, through the creation of federation of states, or
through regional integration). Even though the Abbe de St. Pierre’s Project is more comprehensive than earlier
projects of the Perpetual Peace Project, it nonetheless contains internal limitations both in terms of geographic
and religious specificity.
85 There are three definitive articles of perpetual peace. KANT, supra note 78, at 121‒23. First, “[t]he
civil constitution of each states shall be republican.” Id. at 120. Second, “the law of nations shall be founded
on a federation of states.” Id. at 128. Third, “the rights of men, as citizens of the world, shall be limited to the
conditions of universal hospitality.” Id. at 137. One should note that, for Kant, the three definitive articles for
perpetual peace are interrelated and are not alternatives but rather it takes a combination of all three to achieve
perpetual peace. So by singling out the second article in this Subpart, it might seem to the reader that the other
two articles are not of great relevance. To the contrary, the author of this Article believes that the three
definitive articles should be looked at together. The reason why this Article focuses only on the second article
of Kantian Perpetual Peace is its direct justification for formation of regional integration agreements. While
Kant’s first article “Constitutional Republic State” will bring peace and harmony at the domestic level, it also
diminishes the possibility of state-to-state wars. That is to say, in a republic, which has participation of the
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but not future wars.86 Hence, Kant proposed a “federation of states” rather than
a “nation of states” governed by an international treaty as a measure to halt
future wars.87 This Part attempts to analyze, the value and consistency of
Kantian theory of perpetual peace as a justification for African integration
schemes.
A. Mbeki and Hegel on Kant
Unlike Hegel, who dealt with Kantian theory of perpetual peace
theoretically and directly, Moeletsi Mbeki dealt with the question of peaceful
coexistence practically and without any theoretical claim to Kant’s theory of
perpetual peace. Mbeki argues that perpetual peace could not be a justification
for Africa’s choice to integrate.88 Mbeki substantiates his argument on
recurrence of state-to-state wars, and concludes that since most wars in Africa
are ethnic-based civil wars, regional integration has no correlation on the
peaceful existence of states.89 Although Mbeki does not explicitly define the

public, it is highly unlikely for those who suffer calamities of war to consent to it. In his words, “[n]ow the
republican constitution apart from the soundness of its origin, since it arose from the pure source of the
concept of right, has also the prospect of attaining the desired result, namely, perpetual peace. And the reason
is this. If, as must be so under this constitution, the consent of the subjects is required to determine whether
there shall be war or not, nothing is more natural than that they should weigh the matter well, before
undertaking such a bad business. For in decreeing war, they would of necessity be resolving to bring down the
miseries of war upon their country. This implies: they must fight themselves; they must hand over the costs of
war out of their own property; they must do their poor best to make good the devastation which it leaves
behind . . . .” Id. at 121‒22. Similarly, in Kant’s third definitive article for Perpetual Peace, which Kant calls
“citizenship of the world,” Kant is engaging with the idea of justice as a natural right and explaining its
limitations when it comes to aliens. Id. at 137.
86 Id. at 134 (“Hence there must be an alliance of a particular kind which we many call a covenant of
peace (foedus pacificum), which would differ from a treaty of peace (pactum pacis) in this respect, that the
latter merely puts an end to one war, while the former would seek to put an end to war forever.”).
87 Id. at 129. Kant makes a clear distinction between “federation of states” and “state of nations.” The
former guarantees equality of states while the later envisages a powerful state with command authority over
other member states. In his words: “This would give rise to a federation of nations which, however, would not
have to be a State of nations. That would involve a contradiction. For the term ‘state’ implies the relation of
one who rules to those who obey . . . .” Id. Put simply, federation of states in this Section is defined as the act
where a group of “nation states” or “states” come together and form a central governing unit. On the other
hand, “nation” state is defined when “nations”—homogenous peoples—decide to form a self-governing unit.
88 MOELETSI MBEKI, ARCHITECTS OF POVERTY: WHY AFRICAN CAPITALISM NEEDS CHANGING 133‒34
(2009).
89 Id.; J. Ndumbe Anyu, The International Court of Justice and Border-Conflict Resolution in Africa:
The Bakassi Peninsula Conflict, 18 MEDITERRANEAN Q. 39 (2007). In Africa there have been around 103
ethnic conflicts; which can be attributed to three major categories of the causalities. Id. For Anyu, some
conflicts are old-fashioned land disputes, some are the result of discovery and access to natural resources, and
others are a result of the Berlin conference and its impact on imposing artificially designed territorial
boundaries among and between African people.
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term “war,” he adopts a dual typology of war as either intrastate or interstate
wars based on its participants. However, it is not clear how he came to
conclude that in the past fifty years there were only two state-to-state wars.90 In
state-to-state war, if war is measured by hostile armed conflict, Mbeki’s
headcount of interstate wars in Africa is flawed. If Mbeki’s distinction between
what constitutes and does not constitute war is based on, for instance, “loss of
life,” then he did not make that distinction clear in his work. This confusion
leads one to ask what war is. Alternatively, what is the Kantian conception of
war?
For Kant, peace is an exception to the normal “state of nature,” which is
war.91 The Kantian conception of the “state of nature” emanates from a
pessimist attitude of human nature that Kant uses to appraise states.92 Kant
qualifies his argument and explains that “state of nature” does not mean open
warfare, but rather “a constant threatening that an outbreak may occur.”93 The
distinction is that while warfare and its consequences are expected outcomes of
open hostilities, an unceasing threat of war is an unpredictable situation that
puts everyone on alert and causes them to view their neighbors as possible
enemies. Hence, Kant has a broader conception of war that included not only
“open hostility” but also any threat of war. Moreover, Kant believed a state is a

90 MBEKI, supra note 88. For Mbeki, these wars are: (1) the war between Tanzania and Uganda in 1970;
and (2) the war between Eritrea and Ethiopia between 1998 and 2000. Id. See also Meredith Reid Sarkees, The
Correlates of War Data on War: An Update to 1997, 18 CONFLICT MGMT. & PEACE SCI. 123 (2000), for a
different definition of interstate war formulated by the Correlates of War Project. According to Sarkees,
interstate war is a combat involving armed forces on both sides and fatalities of more than 1000. Id. Although,
Mbeki does not specifically define war, if Mbeki has adopted this definition, it would be correct to conclude
that in the past fifty years of post-independence Africa, there have only been two state-to-state wars. However,
since he did not specify or clarify his definition of war it is difficult to understand how he came to his
conclusion. Moreover, to critique Kantian theory of perpetual peace, one needs to understand Kant’s
conception of war. And Kant’s goal was to eliminate all possibilities of war, irrespective of fatalities
headcount. In addition, if one adopted Black’s Law Dictionary’s definition of war and not just active
hostilities, war is much broader and encompasses all sorts of conflicts that might arise out of different
situations. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1720 (9th ed., 2009) (defining “war” as “hostile conflict by means
of armed forces, carried on between nations, states, or rulers, or sometimes between parties within the same
nation or state”). Hence, one might conclude that Mbeki’s head count of the resurgence of state-to-state wars
in Africa is erroneous as he has missed, for instance, the border conflict between Nigeria and Cameroon.
91 KANT, supra note 78, at 117–18 (“A state of peace among men who live side by side is not the natural
state (status naturalis), which is rather to be described as a state of war . . . .”).
92 Id. at 128 (“Nations, as states, may be judged like individuals who, living in the natural state of
society—that is to say, uncontrolled by external law—injure one another through their very proximity.”).
93 Id. at 117–18.
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voluntary association established by men that serves as a peace institution to
avert the “natural state of nature,” which is war.94
However, the historical factors that led to the formation of modern day
African states present a stronger theoretical challenge for Kant’s theory of
perpetual peace. The impact of colonial imposition of territorial boundaries on
Africa’s people negates voluntary association, which according to Kant, is
central for the elimination of the natural “state of nature.”95 Kant’s
conceptualization of perpetual peace does not require the existence of nation
states, but rather, centers around “voluntary association,” be it among men or
states.96 For Kant, it is the “voluntary association” that is the means to
eliminate the “state of nature.”97 The crucial question, then is how universal is
Kant’s conceptions of “state of nature” and “voluntary association” and their
correlation to the formation of states in the African context?
In the contemporary African context, the “state of nature” that led to
statehood is colonization and racial domination by colonial powers. In Africa,
the distinction also needs to be made between formal statehood and the idea of
nation states. However, the analysis of theorists including Kant, relies on the
idea of “voluntary” or “free” association and formation of states, which was
the case in Europe but not necessarily in Africa.98 Hence, a deconstruction of
the Kantian theory of perpetual peace reveals dual conceptual incompatibilities
barring its application in African integration schemes.
Another theoretical criticism of Kant is Georg W.F. Hegel’s work on
Philosophy of Right.99 Hegel explains that the idea of perpetual peace through
federation of states is contingent on the private sovereign will, which for
Hegel, supersedes any international treaty.100 Understanding Hegel’s criticism
94 Kant subscribes to the Hobbesian conception of statehood. Id. at 118 (quoting THOMAS HOBBES,
LEVIATHAN II, ch. XVIII) (“A commonwealth is said to be instituted, when a multitude of men do agree, and
covenant, every one, with every one, that to whatsoever man, or assembly of men, shall be given by the major
part, the right to present the person of them all, that is to say, to be their representative; every one, as well he
that voted for it, as he that voted against it, shall authorize all the actions and judgments, of that man, or
assembly of men, in the same manner, as if they were his own, to the end, to live peaceably amongst
themselves, and be protected against other men.” (emphasis removed)).
95 See generally Makau wa Mutua, Why Redraw the Map of Africa: A Moral and Legal Inquiry, 16
MICH. J. INT’L L. 1113 (1995).
96 KANT, supra note 78, at 109.
97 Id. at 118–19.
98 Mutua, supra note 95, at 1115.
99 G.W.F. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 264 (S.W. Dyde trans., 2001).
100 Id. (“Kant’s idea was that eternal peace should be secured by an alliance of states. This alliance should
settle every dispute, make impossible the resort to arms for a decision, and be recognized by every state. This
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at a pragmatic level requires inquisition of the 1964 Cairo declaration of
African states on peaceful coexistence.101 In theory African states pledged to
recognize colonial boundaries, but in reality, the ambiguity, incoherence, and
multiplicity of colonial treaties and/or the discovery of mineral resources has
led to several border conflicts in Africa.102 One of the first border conflicts
occurred during the very early stages of African independence between Ghana
and Upper Volta, leading to dissolution of a customs union between the two
states.103 Several other border conflicts in Africa have made their way to the
International Court of Justice and the Permanent Court of Arbitration.104
Moreover, two recent conflicts, one between Cameroon and Nigeria and one
between Eritrea and Ethiopia, were among states that had common regional
integration membership.105 In conclusion, irrespective of formal commitments
to honor colonial boundaries, in the African context, Kantian theory of
perpetual peace is subject to “sovereign will” of states.

idea assumes that states are in accord, an agreement which, strengthened though it might be by moral,
religious, and other considerations, nevertheless always rested on the private sovereign will, and was therefore
liable to be disturbed by the element of contingency.”).
101 Border Disputes Among States, AGH/Res. 16(1), Assembly of Heads of State and Government, Org.
of Afr. Unity, 1st Sess., July 17–21, 1964 (solidifying colonial boundaries as the basis of territorial boundary
formation of post-independence African states). The relevant provision of the Cairo Declaration states: “[A]ll
member states pledge themselves to respect the borders existing on their achievement of national
independence.” Id.
102 See Patricia Berko Wild, The Organization of African Unity and the Algerian-Moroccan Border
Conflict: A Study of New Machinery for Peacekeeping and for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes among
African States, 20 INT’L ORG. 18 (1966) (explaining the origins of the border conflict between Algeria and
Morocco, the author shows that the causes for the dispute were a combination of colonial history,
socioeconomic and political factors).
103 Lincoln P. Bloomfield & Allen Moulton, Cascon Case GUV: Ghana-Upper Volta 1964‒66, MASS.
INST. TECH., http://web.mit.edu/cascon/cases/case_guv.html (last visitied Mar. 6, 2014) (giving a brief
description of the dispute between Ghana and Upper Volta); see also Border Disputes Among States,
AGH/Res. 19(1), Assembly of Heads of State and Government, Org. of Afr. Unity, 1st Sess., July 17–21,
1964. OAU Member States heard grievances of Upper Volta and Ghana and recommended that both states
solve their problems amicably. Id.
104 JOHN W. DONALDSON, PERCEPTIONS OF LEGAL AND GEOGRAPHIC CLARITY: DEFINING INTERNATIONAL
LAND BOUNDARIES IN AFRICA, in ESSAYS IN AFRICAN LAND LAW 14–23 (Robert Home ed., 2011). In
discussing international land disputes that have been adjudicated through adjudication and arbitration,
Donaldson rightfully notes that the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) has adjudicated eight land boundary
disputes in the past fifty years. Id. at 6. Out of these cases, only five were between African states: Burkina
Faso/Mali from 1983 to 1986, Libya/Chad from 1990 to 1994, Cameroon/Nigeria from 1994 to 2002,
Botswana/Namibia from 1996 to 1999, and Benin/Niger from 2002 to 2005. Id. Moreover, three international
land boundary disputes involving at least one African state were arbitrated. Id. These are Egypt/Israel in 1988,
Eritrea/Ethiopia from 2002 to 2008, and the Abyei arbitration in 2009. Id.
105 Both Eritrea and Ethiopia are members of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
(“COMESA”), Inter Governmental Authority for Development (“IGAD”) and had several bilateral trade
agreements among themselves. Id. (citation omitted).
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B. Marketization and Peaceful Coexistence
Hegel’s criticisms of Kant did not stop theorist Norman Angell from
following Kant’s liberal international approach and theorizing on the
relationship between marketization and peaceful coexistence. Angell’s theory
of interdependence, also called the theory of vulnerability, argues that
interdependence increases the vulnerability of states, which leads states to
cooperate for peaceful coexistence.106 Building on the interdependence theory,
classical functionalist theorists explained that peaceful coexistence is actually a
“spillover” effect of economic interdependence.107 Central to both schools of
thought is assessing the empirical impact of interdependence on peaceful
coexistence. This assessment may require answering the following questions:
What is interdependence? How do you measure it? Is it through trade
transaction? What about modes and factors of production?
In analyzing trade relations among African states and their impact on
peaceful coexistence, one can adopt two modules. One is the parallel module,
which argues that peace and trade can coexist separately. Thus, even if two
states are in war and official trade ties are broken, informal underground cross
border trade can continue. For example, the border conflict between Eritrea
and Ethiopia closed all formal trade and diplomatic ties between the two
countries;108 however, an informal trade sector among homogenous ethnic
106 Cornelia Novari, The Great Illusion Revisited: The International Theory of Norman Angell, 15 REV.
INT’L STUD. 341, 342 (1989) (analyzing Norman Angell’s theory of interdependence, alternatively called a
vulnerability theory). For Angell interdependence theory explains why states experience mutual harm, when
things in one country that pose potential harm, whether economic, social or political, end up affecting things in
another country. Id.
107 See IAN BACHE ET AL., POLITICS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 5 (3d ed. 2011)

His scheme was to take individual technical tasks out of the control of governments and to hand
them over to these functional agencies. He believed that governments would be prepared to
surrender control because they would not feel threatened by the loss of sovereignty over, say,
health care or the co-ordination of railway timetables, and they would be able to appreciate the
advantages of such tasks being performed at the regional or world level. As more and more areas
of control were surrendered, states would become less capable of independent action. One day,
the national governments would discover that they were enmeshed in a ‘spreading web of
international activities and agencies.’
Id.
108

Partial Award: Economic Loss Throughout Ethiopia: Ethiopia’s Claim 7 (Eri. V. Eth.) para. 15, 18
(Eri. Eth. Claims Comm’n 2005). Eritrea and Ethiopia had five bilateral agreements relating to trade and
commercial practices between the two countries. Id. Yet, both countries went to war. Id. para. 16. The
Ethiopian government claimed for compensation based on the argument that the relationship between trade
and peace is parallel. Id. para. 18. The position of the Eritrean government cannot be categorized as falling to
either modules but was more rather a theoretically weak defense based on factual rather than legal argument.
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groups continued, irrespective of war.109 The second module is the sequencing
module, which is consistent with the functionalist theory, and argues that trade
follows peace and helps sustain peace by creating interdependence. 110 At the
core of the impact of trade on peaceful coexistence is the idea of
complementarity of goods and factors of production among trading states.
Then again, one needs to substantiate the idea of “economic interdependence”
through empirical evidence, and investigate if it makes states vulnerable
among each other. Here, as discussed in the previous Part and in Table 2.2.1,
the low level of intraregional trade among African states accurately indicates
the low level of economic interdependence among African states. Furthermore,
the concept of “spill over” as theorized by functionalist-theorists contradicts
trajectory of African integration schemes, which started with political
integration instead of economic integration. To clarify, integration in the
European context started as an economic interdependence project that had a
spillover effect on politics, but in Africa, politics are at the core of integration
projects. Therefore, it seems that in theorizing the impact of regional
integration schemes in Africa, one needs to move beyond the conventional
understanding and challenge existing theories.
IV. LAW AND CONCEPTUALIZATION OF INTEGRATION
The previous two Parts of this Article challenged existing theoretical
frameworks for understanding regional integration. This Part is an attempt to
analyze how law or legal scholars conceptualize and engage in integration
studies, specifically focusing on predictability and neutrality as positive
features of law.
While previous integration studies from an economic perspective sought to
study a dynamic economic integration, for peace theorists there was an
underlying emphasis on creating predictable peaceful coexistence either
through a federation of states or through economic interdependence. Both
disciplines acknowledged that integration is a process that requires an
incremental course of change. Similar to peace studies and contrary to dynamic

Id. The Commission subscribed to the sequencing module and stated: “[T]here is a broad consensus that
bilateral treaties, especially those of a political or economic nature, are at the very least suspended by the
outbreak of a war.” Id.
109 UNECA IV, supra note 56, at 153‒64 (noting that Ethiopian customs authorities impounded around
40,000 kilograms of the cereal grain teff that was supposed to be smuggled to Eritrea).
110 See Dale C. Copeland, Economic Interdependence and War: A Theory of Trade Expectations, INT’L
SEC., Spring 1996, at 5.
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or incremental course of change, legal scholars emphasize predictability as a
positive feature of legal systems.111 The idea of “predictability,” despite
making law chthonic and reluctant to change, foresees or eliminates
unintended consequences and thereby creates certainty among contracting
states. However, predictability of law may mean rigidity, but one should note
that law has internal flexibility mechanisms. For instance, variable geometry in
regional integration agreements is a flexibility mechanism attempting to
accommodate diverging preferences of member states of an integration
scheme.112 Hence, through its flexibility mechanisms, law provides a course of
change, albeit a predictable change.
Moreover, the idea of neutrality and immutability of law leads to what
Mohammed Bedjaoui coined as “legal paganism.”113 Legal paganism is an
intra-disciplinary inquisition of law with a fictional understanding. In other
words, law is a freestanding, autonomous enterprise with no attachment to
political, economic, and historical realities of the society.114 It is beyond doubt
that law does not exist in vacuum and in integration studies; law is a variable
that is shaped by economic, historical and political contexts that exist in a
particular integration scheme. This Part offers a landscape of law as a variable
of integration studies. After giving a landscape of the nature and function of
law, this Part will challenge and expose the limitations of the intra-disciplinary
inquisition of law in integration studies of southern African countries.

111 Anna Gardella & Luca G. Radicati di Brozolo, Civil Law, Common Law and Market Integration: The
EC Approach to Conflicts of Jurisdiction, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 611, 612‒13 (2003) (discussing features of a
civil law system as predictability and neutrality of law).
112 GATHII, supra note 4, at 609 (“In the African context, variable geometry refers to rules, principles, and
policies adopted in trade integration treaties that give member states, particularly the poorest members: (i)
policy flexibility and autonomy to pursue at slower paces time-tabled trade commitments and harmonization
objectives; (ii) mechanisms to minimize distributional losses by creating opportunities such as compensation
for losses arising from implementation of region-wide liberalization commitments and policies aimed at the
equitable distribution of the institutions and organizations of regional integration to avoid concentration in any
one member; and (iii) preferences in industrial allocation among members in an RTA and preferences in the
allocation of credit and investments from regional banks.”).
113 MOHAMMED BEDJAOUI, TOWARDS A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 98‒101 (UNESCO
trans., 1979).
114 Id. at 100 (“[B]y detaching law in this way from the reality it governs and imprisoning it in legal
formalism, lawyers end by mummifying law and worshipping it for its own sake.”).
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A. Nature of Law
Most, if not all, regional integration agreements are treaties.115 Within a
broad range, it is possible to divide treaties into conventions and contracts. The
distinction is that, in contracts, states enter into agreements to further their own
interests, while in covenants, states manifest normative commitments.116 The
WTO, took a rationalist approach to treaty obligations in the Japan-Taxes
Alcoholic Beverages case and reasoned that WTO agreements are contractual
agreements driven by the self-interests of contracting parties.117 Even though
WTO agreements do not regulate formation of regional integration schemes,
the trade section of an integration scheme is subject to WTO regulations.118
Moreover, all southern African integration schemes have a trade component,
so southern African states use the flexibility of Article XXIV to surpass antidiscrimination principles of WTO.119 By deduction, one might conclude that
southern African integration schemes are contractual agreements driven by
self-interest.120 This analysis, however, misses the other side of the narrative.

115 Sources of International Law are enumerated under Article 38(1) of the Statue of the International
Court of Justice, which is an integral part of the U.N. Charter. See Statute of the International Court of Justice,
opened for signature June 26, 1945, art. 38, para. 1(a), 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. 993, 3 Bevans 1179. Article 38 (1)
states:

The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are
submitted to it, shall apply: (a) international conventions, whether general or particular,
establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states; (b) international custom, as
evidence of a general practice accepted as law; (c) the general principles of law recognized by
civilized nations; (d) subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings
of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the
determination of rules of law.
Id.
116 Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, in
LEGALIZATION AND WORLD POLITICS 37, 40 (Judith L. Goldstein et al. eds., 2001).
117 Appellate Body Report, Japan Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, Sec. 32, WT/DS8/AB/R (Oct. 4, 1996)
(“The WTO Agreement is a treaty—the international equivalent of a contract. It is self-evident that in an
exercise of their sovereignty, and in pursuit of their own respective national interests, the Members of the
WTO have made a bargain. In exchange for the benefits they expect to derive as Members of the WTO, they
have agreed to exercise their sovereignty according to the commitments they have made in the WTO
Agreement.”).
118 See Zakir Hafez, Weak Discipline: GATT Article XXIV and the Emerging WTO Jurisprudence on
RTAs, 79 N.D. L. REV. 879 (2003) (discussing the historical and jurisprudential background of Article XXIV
of GATT, which excepts WTO Member States from the non-discrimination principle of the global trade
regime); see generally WTO, ANALYTICAL INDEX: SUPPLEMENT COVERING NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN WTO
LAW AND PRACTICE: OCT. 2011–AUG. 2013 (2013) [hereinafter WTO ANALYTICAL INDEX].
119 Id.
120 Note that under WTO, SADC was notified as an integration scheme formed under Article XXIV of
GATT.
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Southern African integration agreements have as many normative prescriptions
as self-interest-driven contractual relations.121 This composition makes it hard
for international legal scholars to follow a binary distinction between
covenants and contracts in categorizing regional integration agreements.122
International legal experts are less concerned with the distinction between
the contract/convention and more concerned with the distinction between “law
making” and “non-law making” treaties. “Law-making” treaties are treaties
whose purpose does not cease with performance of its obligations.123 Human
rights conventions fall to the category of “law-making” treaties. To the
contrary, a “non-law making” treaty ceases to exist when the obligation of the
treaty is met. For instance, the 1953 London Debt Agreement between the
United States and Germany ended once all the obligations it created ended
when the United States cancelled German’s debt in accordance with the treaty
obligations.124 Irrespective of the distinction, all treaties, whether “lawmaking” or “non-lawmaking,” have the effect of law between parties.125
Nevertheless, the distinction is relevant for legal scholars because “lawmaking” treaties have the effect of establishing general law as enumerated in
Article 38 of the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”).126 International law
scholars such as Ian Brownlie and J.L. Brierly concur that “law-making”
treaties are treaties with larger membership and conclude with the assent of
contracting parties of their law-making effect.127 In the southern African
context, for instance Article 4 of the SADC treaty, provides principles of the

121 See Dunia Zongwe, Gender Equality and Harmful Practices in the SADC Gender Protocol: The
Challenges of Cultural Transformation, 12 CURRENT 99 (2008) (discussing how the SADC Gender Protocol
deals with issues of discrimination and harmful practices against women in southern Africa).
122 See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 116, at 40 (discussing how in international legal studies, unlike in
international relations, there is no binary distinction between interest- and norm-based treaties).
123 IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 12 (5th ed., 1998) (“Such treaties create
legal obligations the observance of which does not dissolve the treaty obligation.”).
124 See Agreement on German External Debts, Feb. 27, 1953, 333 U.N.T.S. 3; Timothy W. Guinnane,
Financial Vergangenheitsbewältigung: The 1953 London Debt Agreement (Yale Univ. Econ. Growth Ctr.
Discussion Paper No. 880, 2004), available at http://www.econ.yale.edu/growth_pdf/cdp880.pdf (last visited
Feb. 14, 2013).
125 J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF PEACE 57
(6th ed., 1963). All treaties are law and the Latin maxim, modus et conventio vincunt legem, has application in
international law as much as in domestic law. Id.
126 Statute of the International Court of Justice, opened for signature June 26, 1945, art. 38, para. 1(a), 59
Stat. 1055, T.S. 993, 3 Bevans 1179. The wording of the article is clear that a treaty should be rule
establishing.
127 See BROWNLIE, supra note 121, at 12; BRIERLY, supra note 125, at 58.
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organization that have a law-making effect.128 On the other hand, the SADC
Trade protocol, specifically with the formation of free trade agreements ceases
to have effect when southern African states have established a customs union
among them.129
B. Function of Law
If the nature of law in integration studies is a treaty-based agreement,
which has both normative and interest based contractual provisions, then what
is the function of law? Edward Jenks, an international legal scholar, rightfully
noted that at a domestic level, the idea of “law” implies “compulsion” and
“order.”130 The former, “compulsion,” denotes the correlation between law and
chastisement, where disobeying of “law” leads to punishment of the
lawbreaker.131 The latter, “order,” implies methodical harmony, which is
inseparable and parcel of “compulsion” through the notion of “rights.”132 For
Jenks, continuity in the association of law with “compulsion” and “order” is
central in determining its regulatory function.133 Alternatively, continuity of
law through its regulatory function helps one predict the future.134
To explain the relationship between international relations and international
law, legal scholars such as, Kenneth Abbott and Duncan Snidal, argued that
states choose to govern their relations through legal arrangements to solve
coordination problems.135 Abbott and Sindal’s analysis centered on two forms
of legalization: soft legalization and hard legalization.136 Their analysis
explains how different states with different coordination needs choose one over
the other. Since the nature of law in integration agreements is hard law, this
Article will focus on hard legalization in its discussion of the topic. Hard

128

See SADC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 4(c) (stating that SADC states must act in accordance with human

rights).
129 See Protocol on Trade in the Southern African Development Community, arts. 3–11, Aug. 1, 1996,
http://www.sadc.int/files/4613/5292/8370/Protocol_on_Trade1996.pdf.
130 Edward Jenks, The Function of Law in Society, 5 J. COMP. LEGIS. & INT’L L. 169, 170 (1923).
131 Id. (“Still, it is the general doctrine of jurists that there can be no true law (even in their sense) without
a ‘sanction’—some penalty or adhibition which makes the breaking of a law an unpleasant thing for the
breaker.”).
132 See id. at 169‒72.
133 See id.
134 Id. at 176 (“We do not, in fact, lawyers or laymen, think or speak of isolated commands or expedients
as ‘laws.’ We regard it as one of the tests of a ‘law,’ that it enables us to predict, with varying degrees of
certainty, the sequence of future events.”).
135 See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 116, at 37.
136 Id.
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legalization, which Abbott and Sindal measure through “obligation,”
“precision,” and “delegation,” increases the credibility of commitments.137
Alternatively, law imposes consequences for violations of international law
designed to solve coordination problems. Similar to Jenks’s analysis of
function of law at the domestic level, one might argue that, for Abbott and
Sindal, the function of law in a legalized state-to-state coordination is nothing
but regulatory.
Using Abbott and Sindal’s framework of analysis, in the context of, for
instance the SADC treaty, reveals that southern African integration schemes
have a legalized framework of cooperation with clear and precise obligations,
backed by a dispute-resolution tribunal. In practice however, high-level of
legalization does not guarantee compliance with integration obligations.138
Then the question will be: how could law have a regulatory function if there is
non-compliance?139 Alternatively, has the function of law changed in African
integration schemes?
C. Politicization of Law
Theoretically, at the regional level, community law is an apparatus used to
further raison d’être of integration.140 Treaty negotiation can be political, but
lawyers either hope or believe that application of law is apolitical. The notion
137

Id. at 37–38.
See generally Gerhard Erasmus, Is the SADC Trade Regime a Rules-Based System?, 1 SADC L. J. 17
(2011). Rules-based trade is defined as:
138

[T]rade arrangement between states governed by international agreements which contain specific
obligations regarding outcomes and practices. The parties have to comply with these obligations
to ensure certainty and predictability, and transparency is a prerequisite. The substantive content
of such trade rules can normally be distilled from the basic principles of the [WTO]—such as
those relating to the most-favoured nation and national treatment, or those dealing with market
access—or other multilateral disciplines applicable to trade-related conduct involving the
movement of goods and services across borders.
Erasmus used the following barometer in order to determine whether SADC is a rules based system: (1) “[t]he
SADC legal instruments,” (2) “[m]ember states’ practice as regards the implementation of SADC legal
instruments,” (3) “[d]omestic implementation and enforcement of SADC legal instruments,” and (4)
“[d]evelopments around the SADC Tribunal.” Id. at 37. After applying this four factor barometer, Erasmus
eventually concludes that although SADC is a rules based system in reality it suffers from poor
implementation and lack of compliance of regional treaty obligations. Id.
139 See id.
140 See, e.g., David M. Trubek, Developmental States and the Legal Order: Towards a New Political
Economy of Development and Law (Univ. Wis. Law Sch., Law & the New Dev. State Working Paper, 2010).
Classical developmentalists used law to ensure state intervention, while neo-liberalists used law as to prevent
state intervention in markets. Id. at 8.
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of neutrality of law argues that the socio-economic and political situations of
member states, with the exception of interstate war, do not hamper the legality
or binding nature of a treaty agreement. Nevertheless, socio-economic and
political factors play a huge role in the implementation of treaty obligations.
The “enforcement” or “implementation” of a treaty obligation is a logical
expectation of the regulatory function of law. The question this Subpart
attempts to answer is, if there is low or no enforcement of a treaty obligation,
then has the function of law been changed or altered through practice?
Alternatively, does the non-enforcement of a treaty obligation amount to
amendment through practice?141 The issue of treaties over time, or the impact
of subsequent practice on altering a treaty obligation has and is an issue that
has not been resolved. The Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties (“VCLT”)
mandates use of both “textual” and “state practice” as equivalent means of
treaty interpretation.142 Given the difficulty of defining what amounts to “state
practice,” international dispute resolution mechanisms have adopted different
modes of interpretation, irrespective of the wording of Article 31 of VCLT.143
Of greater importance for southern African integration schemes are the
practices of WTO dispute resolution institutions. The International Law
Commission (“ILC”) rightfully noted that WTO has put emphasis on text-

141

A classical example of amendment of treaty obligation through practice is Article 27(3) of U.N.
Charter. See U.N. Charter art. 27, para. 3 (“Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be
made by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members;
provided that, in decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall
abstain from voting.”). Although now, there seems to be a consensus on interpretation of Article 27(3) of the
U.N. Charter, historically legal scholars extensively debated its interpretation, specifically on the issue of
amendment through practice. See, e.g., Constantin A. Stavropoulos, The Practice of Voluntary Abstentions by
Permanent Members of the Security Council Under Article 27, Paragraph 3, of the Charter of the United
Nations, 61.3 Am. J. Int’l L. 737, 746 (1967). The issue was that textual interpretation of Article 27(3) does
not permit permanent members of Security Council to abstain. Id. Alternatively, the argument posed was
textual reading of Article 27(3) required permanent members of Security Council to provide a positive vote.
Id. However, in practice, permanent members of Security Council do abstain. For instance in Security Council
Resolution 221/1966 both France and the then Soviet Union abstained. S.C. Res. 221, U.N. Doc. S/RES/221
(April 9, 1966). The question is then, what happens when permanent member of Security Council abstains?
Through subsequent practice, Article 27(3) was reinterpreted and understood to mean that abstention by a
permanent member of Security Council does not amount to vetoing Security Council resolution. See, e.g.,
Stavropoulos, supra; see also U.N. Charter art. 27, para. 3.
142 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
143 Treaties Over Time, U.N. Int’l L. Comm. [ILC], Rep. on its 63d Sess., Apr. 26–Aug. 12, 2011, Ch. XI,
U.N. Doc. A/66/10 (2011) (identifying three approaches of treaty interpretation by international dispute
resolution institutions: (1) take all approaches of interpretation as enumerated under Article 31 of VCLT; (2)
text oriented interpretation; and (3) purpose-oriented interpretation.).
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oriented interpretation, thereby giving a certain degree of certainty of law over
time.144
In the southern African context, specifically speaking in the SADC, the
practice is a collection of politicization of law by southern African
governments and purposive interpretation by the SADC Tribunal.145 In other
words, actions and decision of the Tribunal are subject to politics of southern
African governments.146 Hence, enforcement of community law in a politicized
integration project is a combination of legal reasoning and coercion. At the
community level, legal reasoning is a function of both community and
domestic courts, while coercion is that of executive branches of member states.
The argument here is that community law is a political tool for governments of
southern African countries to use. Here, one should make a distinction between
community courts, which resort to progressive legal analysis, and the
reluctance by political authorities to enforce community decisions. A classical
question to ask will be, is law considered politics at a community level?147
Alternatively, does the “politicization of community law” mean same as “law
as politics”? Even though, the distinction between both phrases might not be
visible, for the purposes of this Article the “politicization of function of law” in
the southern African context means enforcement of community law as a highly
politicized project of southern African governments.
D. Consensus of Non-Enforcement
Politicization of law can render legalization of integration project irrelevant
and even lead to “disassociation from law.” In the African context, legal
scholars analyzed the gap between regional treaty agreements and
enforcement, alternatively called “disassociation from law,” as the result of
144

Id. at 281. The ILC substantiates its characterization of WTO practice on treaty interpretation by
refereeing to Appellate Body Reports on Brazil-Aircraft Case. Id. at 281 n.651.
145 Id. (noting a purpose-oriented interpretation by regional human rights courts). The SADC Tribunal,
even though not specifically a human rights court, adopted purposive interpretation with regard to specific
human rights provisions of the SADC Treaty. Campbell v. Zimbabwe Case No. 03/2009 SADC (T) 2009.
146 See Franny Rabkin, SADC Tribunal A Political Hot Potato, BDLIVE (Aug. 6, 2012), http://www.
businessday.co.za/Articles/Content.aspx?id=146693.
147 See Mark V. Tushnet, Critical Legal Theory, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW
AND LEGAL THEORY 80, 80 (Martin P. Golding & William A. Edmundson eds., 2005). For critical legal studies
scholars (CRITS), law is politics because: (1) legal reasoning is not different from political arguments; (2)
disputes within law were resolved in the same way as disputes within politics; and (3) disputes do not
disappear with rendition of authoritative decisions. Id. If law is politics at the community level, one will have
to engage in a hair split analysis of those three elements. However, this author’s focus is not on analyzing law
as politics but rather on explaining that enforcement of law is highly politicized.
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“lack of political will” or “lack of resources.”148 The most notable, alternative
rationalization of disassociation of law from practice is James Gathii’s analysis
of flexibility in African integration schemes.149 Disassociation of law from
practice in integration schemes might be a “crisis of law;” however, it is a
manifestation of “consensus of non-enforcement” among southern African
countries with treaty obligations. Choice of phraseology, “consensus of nonenforcement” over Gathii’s “flexibility,” is broad and includes formal and
informal flexibilities of integration schemes.150 For Gathii, African regional
integration treaties are flexible by design and practice.151 However, “consensus
of non-enforcement,” acknowledging formal flexibilities is limited to informal
disassociation of law from practice. Hence, in the southern African context, it
focuses on the lack of enforcement of integration commitments and the mutual
failure of member states to bring disputes against themselves to regional
courts. In short, consensus of non-enforcement is a practice of southern
African integration schemes to subterfuge treaty obligations through political
relations.
One could argue that consensus of non-enforcement is not different from
the political rhetoric or lack of “political will” critique of African integration
schemes. For the lack of “political will” argument to make sense one needs to
answer the following question: why do African governments expend time,
energy, and resources on treaty negotiations if there is no will in the first
148 Percy S. Mistry, Africa’s Record of Regional Co-operation and Integration, 99 AFR. AFF. 553, 554
(2000) (discussing Africa’s integration initiative more as a rhetoric or instinct rather than an intellectually
grounded rational choice).
149 See GATHII supra note 4, at 576.
150 Id. at 573. Gathii enumerates six defining characteristics of flexibility in African
integration schemes:

First, these RTAs are regarded as establishing flexible regimes of cooperation as opposed to
containing rules requiring scrupulous and rigorous adherence. Second, African RTAs incorporate
as a central feature the principle of variable geometry adopting steps for meeting time tabled and
other commitments. Third, African RTAs adopt a broad array of social, economic and political
objectives without giving salience to any set of objectives. Fourth, African RTAs demonstrate a
particular preference for functionally specific objectives to undertake discrete projects and to
serve as forums for the integrated development of common resources such as river basins that cut
across national boundaries. Fifth, African RTAs demonstrate a remarkable commitment to the
equitable distribution of gains from trade and a corresponding weakness in the adoption of nondiscrimination trade principles and the related objectives of trade liberalization. Sixth, African
RTAs are characterized by multiple and overlapping memberships exemplifying a classic case of
the “spaghetti bowl.”
Id.
151 See id. For Gathii, African regional integration agreements show that flexibility is entrenched in the
design and practice of constituting treaty. Id.
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place? Furthermore, as a credulous argument, “lack of political will” makes
African integration initiatives oblique, tautological, and exigent get-together
functions of state officials. On the other hand, “consensus of non-enforcement”
maintains the positive connotation of African integration initiatives.
“Consensus of non-enforcement” is an adventitious outcome of both
internal and external politics of southern African countries. As such,
uncertainty is a central attribute of “consensus of non-enforcement,” both in
terms of outcomes of disputes and in terms of the life span of extant consensus.
Shifts in internal and external political relations can easily influence paradigms
of integration schemes. Furthermore, the probability of punctilious
enforcement of regional treaty obligations is historically non-existent among
southern African states. Internal politics, such as Botswana’s problems with
the Sun people, affects the way Botswana will react to human rights violations
in southern African region.152 Hypothetically, Botswana might issue formal
statements condemning human rights violations of another southern African
state, but for it to take legal action in the SADC Tribunal means that it is
ignoring its vulnerability to similar action by other states. Therefore, internal
politics among southern African countries plays a vital role in creating a
consensus of non-enforcement in the region and a move from meticulous
enforcement of treaty obligations. Similarly, external politics or political
relations among southern African countries, rooted in deep history of
resistance against colonial and racial domination created a sense of solidarity
among them. In conclusion, a combination of both internal and external
politics led to secession from formalistic treaty relations in southern African
integration initiatives.
E. Integration Pessimism and Optimism
It is important for legal scholars engaged in the intra-disciplinary
inquisition of integration schemes that their success rests on the legal
architecture of the particular integration agreement and Member States
compliance with it. Without regard to the socioeconomic and political impacts
of integration initiatives, then integration scholars will generally be pessimist
or optimist of regional integration, based on Member States’ compliance or

152 See, e.g., K. Bojosi, INT’L LABOR ORG. [ILO], BOTSWANA: CONSTITUTIONAL, LEGISLATIVE AND
ADMINISTRATIVE PROVISIONS CONCERNING INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 6 (2009), available at http://www.chr.up.ac.
za/chr_old/indigenous/country_reports/Country_reports_Botswana.pdf.
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non-compliance with the laws governing the integration agenda.153 One of the
problems with this narrow approach to integration studies and measure of
regional integration is that legal scholars are only focused on understanding the
status of community law at the domestic level of Member States and its
coherence with the laws and other international obligations of said states.154
Furthermore, legal scholars are also engaged in understanding the governance
structure and organizational architecture of integration projects, which further
reinforces the emphasis on treaty compliance or lack thereof as measure of the
success of integration projects.155 To clarify, the author is not arguing that
understanding the coherence, supremacy, direct-effect, and organizational
structure of integration schemes is irrelevant. Instead, the author wants to
emphasize that understanding regional integration in the African context is a
much more sophisticated discourse while intra-disciplinary evaluation of
integration is rather limiting.156 In conclusion, it is time to rethink the idea of
law as a freestanding enterprise in integration studies.
V. CONCLUSIONS: TOWARDS A BROADER CONCEPTION OF INTEGRATION
The above sections show four approaches (namely historical, economic,
political, and legal), which are a representation of the intra-disciplinary
inquisition of integration without epistemic synergy. The question then
remains: how should the different approaches relate to offer a broader, if not
comprehensive, conception of integration? The central argument of this Part is

153 See GATHII, supra note 4, at 575; see also Adebayo Adedeji, Creating the Conditions for Integration,
AFR. RECOVERY (Sept. 1, 2002), http://www.globalpolicy.org/home/162-general/27778.html. See generally
Mistry, supra note 148 (analyzing African integration schemes as overly ambitious and implying the extant
disassociation between commitments and practice and thereby non compliance with treaty obligations). In his
interview, Adedeji alludes to the existent of third group of integration scholars. Adedeji, supra. The third tier
of scholars are neither pessimist nor optimist of integration schemes but rather are indifferent. Id. Furthermore,
Adedeji notes that those who are indifferent are those who have come to realize the realities of African
economies. Id. In his words, “All the regional economic arrangements throughout the developing world did not
fully achieve their objectives. But the European Community did. Of course, if you look at the period of the
1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, the European economies were moving fast, expanding. Therefore, the environment
for regional integration was there. That is what has been absent in Africa. We don’t have an enabling
environment for integration, because we have stagnant, declining economies.” Id.
154 See, e.g., Iwa Salami, Legal Considerations for Devising a Governance Structure for the African
Union, 16 AFR. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 262, 272‒73 (2008) (discussing the status of supremacy and how it relates
to success of African integration initiatives).
155 See Alemayehu Geda & Haile Kebret, Regional Economic Integration in Africa: A Review of
Problems and Prospects with a Case Study of COMESA, 17 J. AFR. ECON. 357, 367, 380 (2007) (discussing
lack of implementation as one of the failures of African integration projects).
156 See id. at 382. The understanding here is that law is only one variable of an integration project.

DIRAR GALLEYSPROOFS2

156

7/28/2014 11:17 AM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28

that conceptualizing “integration as emancipation”157 can bring convergence
both conceptually and substantively to the existent epistemological pluralism.
During the formative years of the OAU, the debate on emancipation was
limited to colonialism, neocolonialism, and racial domination.158 The founding
fathers failed to deal with other forms of oppression that existed in the
continent, irrespective of the eminent need for struggle from colonial
oppression.159 For instance, both Nyerere and Nkrumah, who were socialist in
their political alienation, reiterated a society based on egalitarianism, equality
and unity.160 However, both ran into a contradiction several times during the
implementation of their policies and resorted to coercion.161 Similarly, Selassie
157 How do you define emancipation? Is it freedom? Is it self-determination? Alternatively, is it both?
During the 1960s, self-determination movements of African people were part of the continental emancipation
project. Emancipation simultaneously, with self-determination, meant removal of restraints imposed by former
colonists over colonized peoples and territories. Those restraints were political; they limited African political
establishments from participating equally with European states. Second, the constraints were also social;
colonists imposed a social racial hierarchical structure that excluded Africans from participating equally with
European races. Furthermore, laws imposed on African territories and peoples without any legitimate
democratic procedure legalized those social and political restraints. With the advent of decolonization, restraint
for anti-imperialist movements comes from former colonial masters. While for other human rights movements,
restraints on freedom might come from national governments, foreign governments and society as a whole.
Hence, for the purposes of this Article, emancipation is defined in accordance with Black’s Law Dictionary
definition but with some modification. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “emancipate” as: “[t]o set free from
legal, social, or political restraint.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 598 (9th ed., 2009). Hence, for the purpose of
this Article, emancipation is the removal of restraints on human freedom irrespective of its local or global
origins, whether it is economic, social, legal or political.
158 Although the founding fathers acknowledged the importance of freedom for development in Africa,
their emphasis was on decolonization and movement against racial (white) domination. See Nkrumah Address,
supra note 17, at 35; Nyerere Address, supra note 18, at 100; Selassie Address, supra note 9, at 2.
159 See Thenjiwe Major & Thalia M. Mulvihill, Julius Nyerere (1922‒1999), An African Philosopher, Reenvisions Teacher Education to Escape Colonialism, 3 J. MARXISM & INTERDISC. INQUIRY 15, 16 (2009).
160 Id. (discussing how Nyerere thought that the economic system and ideologies introduced by colonists
into African society were based on capitalist ideologies that encouraged individualism in contrary to African
communal way of life).

“Capitalism fosters excessive individualism; promotes the competitive rather than the
cooperative instinct in man; exploits the weak; divides the society into hostile groups and
generally promotes inequality in the society.” He believed that capitalism regarded some
individuals as superior (the rich) and others as inferior (the poor). He further asserted that the
major aim of capitalism was the production of goods and profits, not human satisfaction or the
interest of the consumer. Capitalism encouraged inequality since each person was allowed to
acquire as much as one can. According to Nyerere, these capitalist ideas could not be reconciled
with African values; therefore, he advocated for Socialism.
Id. (quoting J.A. AKINPELU, AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION 115 (1981)
(discussing Nyerere’s conception of capitalism)).
161 See Leander Schneider, Freedom and Unfreedom in Rural Development: Julius Nyerere, Ujamaa
Vijijini, and Villagization, 38 CAN. J. AFR. STUD. 344, 369–71 (2004) (giving several examples of Nyerere
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maintained a feudal land ownership system to the dismay of peasants in
Ethiopia.162 Hence, it is fair to conclude that the continental emancipation
project excluded issues of minority groups, such as women and peasants, and
also excluded other forms of oppression, such as issues of Ethiopia’s
annexation of Eritrea, among others.163 Similarly, classical theories of
integration seem to lack the capacity to fully explicate African integration
schemes, either due to a lack of adequate empirical data in the African context
or due to the fact that they were developed in relation to integration schemes of
developed north. Moreover, substantively speaking, emancipatory movements
in the past sixty years of the continent’s independence have taken all forms and
shapes ranging from gay and lesbian rights, women’s rights, and human rights
movements. Hence, the conceptualization of integration as emancipation
allows one to look at human rights movements not as a spillover of economic
integration, but rather as a central theme of the integration project of Member
States.164 By including emancipation as an end of integration projects, it allows

resorting to coercion and his endorsement of coercion to enforce Ujamaa; see also Randi Rønning Balsvik,
Student Protest—University and State in Africa 1960–1995, 2 F. FOR DEV. STUD. 301 (1998) (noting student
protests against coercive government actions in Africa).
162 See Alden Whitman, Haile Selassie of Ethiopia Dies at 83, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1975, at A1, for
information on the circumstances that led to the end of Haile Selassie’s rule in Ethiopia.
163 By focusing on forms of oppression that emanate from colonists, the 1960s emancipation project of the
continent did nothing but white wash forms of oppression that existed in the society. See, e.g., Francis K
Makoa, Gender and Politics: A Note on Gender Inequality in Lesotho, 12 J. SOC. DEV. AFR. 5 (1997)
(“Basotho women led by Lesotho’s 70-member Federation of Female Lawyers, are waging a vigorous
campaign against sex and other forms of discrimination based on gender. This campaign is directed, in
particular, at the country’s laws, customs, traditions and social norms that govern the relationship between men
and women. They are calling for radical legal and social reforms that will end gender inequality and thus
ensure their full participation in and contribution to the process of development.”); see also Ngianga-Bakwin
Kandala et al., Spatial Distribution of Female Genital Mutilation in Nigeria, 81 AM. SOC’Y J. TROPICAL MED.
HYGIENE 784, 784 (2009) (discussing how the practice of mutilating female genitalia can be justified culturally
and socially justified); see also MJ Maluleke, Culture, Tradition, Custom, Law and Gender Inequality, 15
POTCHEFSTROOM ELECTRONIC L. J. 1 (2012) (analyzing harmful customary practices and calling for a cultural
revival to bring about gender equality and development.); Information by Country, INT’L GAY & LESBIAN
HUM. RTS. COMM’N, http://www.iglhrc.org/cgi-bin/iowa/region/8.html (last visited Sept. 4, 2012) (arguing that
the majority of African states criminalize consensual homosexual practices). Advocates and sympathizers of
the movement for equality and decriminalization of homosexual activity face all forms of persecution. See id.
While movements against racial domination and anti-colonization were recognized as emancipation projects;
women’s rights movements and other human rights movements were considered as national equality
movements. The distinction being, as a continental project, emancipation was a priority for African
governments. On the other hand, equality movements were left to the domestic political policies of Member
States.
164 See Andrés Malamud, Eur. Univ. Inst., Spillover in European and South American Integration. An
Assessment, Delivered at Meeting of the Latin American Studies Association (Sept. 6–8, 2001), available at
http://lasa.international.pitt.edu/Lasa2001/MalamudAndres.pdf (arguing that neo-functionalists like Ernst Haas
view regional integration is not a passionate commitment but rather a process of voluntary unification of states
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one to envisage a development project as freedom in all its senses.165 In
conclusion, this Part is an attempt to create a synergistic effect of integration
studies by re-conceptualizing regional integration in Africa as process of
forming a whole for emancipation of all.
A. Romantic Idealism Vis-à-Vis Broader Conception of Integration
Re-conceptualizing “integration” as “emancipation” opens the door to
possible criticism that the idea is too idealistic. To challenge such criticism,
this Subpart will theoretically and pragmatically justify why re-conceptualizing
integration is not only relevant but also a necessary step for integration studies
today. At the theoretical level, re-conceptualization of integration as
emancipation requires showing the interconnectedness of abstractions and
ideas of regional integration. With a pluralistic conceptualization of
integration, the four approaches give different interpretations, goals, and
conceptual understandings of integration. Similarly, the four approaches focus
on a different objective, effect, and purpose of integration.

through utilitarian and pragmatic decisions of political actors). Spillover is “a given action, related to a specific
goal, creates a situation in which the original goal can be assured only by taking further actions, which in turn
create a further condition and a need for more, and so forth.” Id. (quoting LEON LINDBERG, THE POLITICAL
DYNAMICS OF EUROPEAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 9 (1963)). Simplistically put, the formation of the
European Economic Community, which had narrow economic objectives, had a spillover to the development
of human rights institutions at the EU level. See id.
165 See generally AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM (1999). Mainstream economists, such as
Milton Friedman, used freedom language to argue for neoliberal conception of development. With emphasis
on negative freedom, mainstream economists advocated for wellbeing of individuals through GDP increase,
giving consumers choice of product and price and free market. On the contrary, for Amartya Sen, positive
freedom is the means and end of development. Id. Sen’s emphasis on positive freedom moves welfare analysis
from markets and commodities dynamics to a much more sophisticated measure of wellbeing based on a
person’s functioning and opportunities. Id. Although, Sen did not make a list of what he considers to be basic
freedoms or capabilities, Martha Nussbaum took Sen’s analysis a step further by listing capabilities. Martha C.
Nussbaum, Capabilities as Fundamental Entitlements: Sen and Social Justice, 9 FEMINIST ECON. 33, 41‒42
(2003). For Nussbaum, acknowledging Sen’s capabilities approach and its link with human rights, rightfully
noted that capabilities language has more precision and helps critical scholars overcome debates, for instance,
it helps one move beyond the rights and duties discourse. Id. For her, central capabilities deal with: (1) life, (2)
bodily health, (3) bodily integrity, (4) senses, imagination and thought, (5) emotions, (6) practical reason, (7)
affiliation, (8) other species, (9) play, and (10) control over one’s environment. Id. The central capabilities list
for Nussbaum is open-ended to encompass different cultures, societies and capabilities. Id. The author’s use of
the term “freedom” in this Part is in line with Sen and Nussbaum’s conception of positive freedom. However,
at this point the author prefers to leave listing capabilities or freedoms to specific social contract that exists
between governments and people of a particular state.
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Justifications of Regional Integration Projects among SADC states
Apartheid Era

Post Apartheid Era

1960 -1980

1980-1993

1994-2005

2006 till present

Emancipation

+

+

_

_

Peaceful Coexistence
Economic
Development
Law

_

_

+

+

+

+

+

+

_

_

_

_

Table 2.6.2.1: + means has relevance, - means no or little relevance.

An alternative explanation for choices and prominence of disciplinary
understanding of regional integration is mirrored through episodes of
integration studies and its corresponding relationship with objectives of
integration project in the continent, as shown in table 2.6.2. In the formative
years of voluntary association of African states, referred to as the first episode,
a cursory exploration of objectives of regional or sub-regional integration
schemes reveals that the central objective of integration in most, if not all,
African integration schemes was emancipation. With a limited understanding
of emancipation for southern African integration schemes, specifically
speaking the SADC, emancipation as a central objective of integration extends
up to the early 1990s, the time of formal end of racial domination in South
Africa.166 Concurrent to the emancipation project of colonized people, the
underdeveloped SADC Member States gained independence and sought
economic development and/or economic independence from the then apartheid
South Africa.167 Hence, emancipation had a dual objective of leading to
166 Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP), SADC, http://www.sadc.int/index.
php?cID=201(last visited Mar. 3, 2014) (stating that the ultimate goal of SADC’s current Regional Indicative
Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) is to deepen integration in the region with a view to eliminate poverty
and attain other economic and non-economic goals). The Front Line States, formed by Angola, Botswana,
Mozamibque, Tanzania and Zambia, initialed and promoted regional integration among southern African
states. Frontline States, S. AFR. HIST. ONLINE, http://www.sahistory.org.za/organisations/frontline-states (last
visited Mar. 25, 2014). Established in 1975, the initiative aimed at political liberation of all southern African
states, and coordinated efforts to support national liberation movements, anti-colonialism, and anti-apartheid
movements. See Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP), supra.
167 Christine Ega Mbakile-Moloi, Copycat Theory: Testing for Fiscal Policies Harmonization in the
Southern African Coordinating Community (SADC) and Sub-Saharan Africa (SAA) (Jan. 5, 2007) (Ph.D.
dissertation, Georgia State University), available at http://scholarworks.gsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=
1021&context=econ_diss. “Most of the countries of Southern Africa ultimately achieved political
independence, but against a background of mass poverty, economic backwardness . . . [and the] threat of
powerful and hostile white minority ruled neighbors . . . . [Thus], the leaders saw the promotion of economic
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political and economic interdependence, while fighting against apartheid South
Africa and economic underdevelopment. In the second episode, the postApartheid era, the emphasis on emancipation both as political and economic
agenda ended and shifted to rhetoric of Eurocentric justifications of regional
integration. Therefore, existent integration schemes among many Southern
African countries adopted such conceptions of trade liberalization as landmark
of integration achievements.
1. Emancipation: Between Colonization and Racial Domination
If an ideal integration scheme is a legally binding voluntary association of
states, for emancipation of all, the effluence in defining “emancipation” is
central to re-conceptualizing integration. The continental emancipation project,
as shown in Table 2.6.2.3, sought both emancipation of the African citizenry
from racial domination and that of the African state from colonization. This
dual movement for emancipation though related is different and concentric.
Emancipation of state may end with decolonization.168 Emancipation for
“individual,” even in its narrowest sense, emancipation from racial domination,
did not end with the end of colonization.169 A plausible presentation of
individual emancipatory movements in Africa includes emancipation from
oppressive societal norms and oppression by African states.170 During
and social development through cooperation and integration as the next logical step after political
independence.” Id.
168 See BEDJAOUI, supra note 113, at 82 (explaining that decolonization as a “logical reversal of what
preceded it, [and] implies, in theory, a fundamental policy of eliminating inegalitarian links” and discussing
how decolonization can be a mirage of formal political independence, in era of neocolonialism and
imperialism); see also Michael Adas, Contested Hegemony: The Great War and the Afro-Asian Assault on the
Civilizing Mission Ideology, 15 WORLD HIST. 31, 62–63 (2004) (discussing decolonization as contestation of
European civilizing mission).
169 See Onyeonoro S. Kamanu, Secession and the Right of Self-Determination: An O.A.U. Dilemma, 12 J.
MODERN AFR. STUD. 355, 355‒66 (1974) (discussing Africa’s support for self-determination from colonial
Europe but denial of the same request in the postcolonial setting). Kamanu criticizes the concept of
“pigmentational self-determination” of Ali Mazrui, as inconclusive. Id. at 356–57. For instance, the Southern
Sudanese liberation movement from Sudan was considered illegal, even despite the different pigmentation of
Northern and Southern Sudanese. Id. at 357. Kamanu contends that African nationalists’ opposition to
European rule was not because Europeans are not Africans, but rather because it was oppressive; therefore, it
is hypocritical to turn a blind eye when oppression is internal. Id. at 358.
170 See Campbell v. Zimbabwe, Case No. 2/2007 (SADC(T) 2007. One may interpret the Campbell case
as a case of oppression by the state of Zimbabwe. In that case, Mr. Campbell and other white citizens of
Zimbabwe sought emancipation from racial domination by a majority black-ruled state. Indeed, Mr. Campbell
sought justice from oppressive behavior of the state. One could also argue that since Zimbabwe’s policy of
discrimination against white minorities was not only supported but also fully endorsed by several members of
Zimbabwean society, discrimination against Mr. Campbell and other white minorities was actually a societal
form of oppression. Indeed, the question is where do you draw the line and say this is the act of the society and
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decolonization, oppression was not rooted out, even though political
oppression from colonists ended.171 For instance, the existence of intra-state
ethnic conflicts in Africa illustrate and manifest racial domination, whereby an
ethnic group framed as an interest group guards its economic and political
interests. This obscures the need for emancipation from fear of future social,
economic or political domination.172
List of major cases against Republic of Zimbabwe in SADC Tribunal
Parties

Cause of Action

Campbell V. Republic of
Zimbabwe
Luke Munyanda Tembani
V. Republic of Zimbabwe
Gondo and others V.
Republic of Zimbabwe
United People’s Party of
Zimbabwe V. SADC,
Zimbabwe and others

Violation of 4(c), and 6(2) of
SADC Treaty
Violation of 4(c), and 6(1) of
SADC Treaty
Violation of 4(c) and 6(1) of
SADC Treaty
Not SADC Treaty but power
sharing agreement between
political parties in Zimbabwe

Decision on Cause of
Action
Decision in favor of
Plaintiff
Decision in favor of
Plaintiff
Decision in favor of
Plaintiff
Decision in favor of
defendants

2.6.2.2. List of Major Cases against Republic of Zimbabwe in SADC Tribunal

General Practice in regional courts of the African continent show an
importune for emancipation by African citizenry. For instance, the Campbell
not the state? It seems both questions merge if the state advocates or tolerates racial domination in any form or
way. On the other hand, when a state sanctions discrimination against any class of society for instance women
but a society practices discriminatory practices, it becomes easier to make a binary division between societal
and state forms of oppression. For an example of societal forms of oppression against women in Yoruba
communities, see Adeyinka Abideen Aderinto, Subordinated by Culture: Constraints of Women in a Rural
Yoruba Community, Nigeria, 10 NORDIC J. AFR. STUD. 176, 183 (2001).
171 See Alexander Naty, Memories of the Kunama of Eritrea Towards Italian Colonialism, 56 AFRICA:
RIVISTA TRIMESTRALE DI STUDI E DOCUMENTAZIONE DELL’ISTITUTO ITALIANO PER L’AFRICA E L’ORIENTE
573, 573‒75 (2001) (explaining criticizing a paradigm of colonist and resistance movements in post-colonial
studies). Naty explains that a particular ethnic group’s attitude towards colonizers is based on their previous
status as either “dominators” or “dominated” in a particular society. Id. at 574. Therefore, Naty criticizes
simplistic understanding of why the Kunama did not oppose colonization and contributed minimally to
Eritrea’s independence movement, explaining it as the result of their pre-colonial oppression by the
highlanders of Eritrea and Ethiopia. See id. at 589–89. However, with the end of colonial domination in
Eritrea, Kunama, labeled “collaborators” and other negative connotations, lost respect and equal treatment by
the highlanders and hence follows their given status or lack therefore in post-independence Eritrea. See id. at
588.
172 See Ibrahim Elbadawi & Nicholas Sambanis, Why Are There So Many Civil Wars in Africa:
Understanding and Preventing Violent Conflict, 9 J. AFR. ECON. 244 (2000) (arguing that the cause of Africa’s
civil war is poverty and not ethno-linguistic fragmentation of the continent); see also David A. Lake &
Donald Rothchild, Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict, 21 INT’L SEC. 41, 41
(1996) (arguing that ethnic conflict is not a mere result of ethnic differences, but rather a collective fear of
what the future holds for that particular ethnic group).
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case was the first of such supplications that the SADC Tribunal entertained.173
As shown in Table 2, it is clear that the existent lack of respect for equality and
for human rights in Zimbabwe has led to four major cases against the
Republic.174 All of these cases except one dealt with Articles 4 and 6 of the
SADC Treaty.175 Individual claims for justice can be brought to the SADC
tribunal, especially where no domestic forum was available for applicants,
such as in the Campbell case.176 The Campbell case differs from the Gondo
case, in which applicants successfully litigated against violence inflicted upon
them by agents of Republic of Zimbabwe in domestic courts.177 From these
cases, one can construct a view that the SADC Tribunal in southern African
states assumed the role of a final adjudicator, not just for issues of racial
discrimination as in Campbell, but also for issues of implementation of
domestic court decisions, as in Gondo. Furthermore, one can deduce from the
jurisprudence of both cases that the SADC tribunal, if faced with other human
rights issues, would have adopted progressive interpretation of member
obligations in favor of victims of human rights violations. Regardless of
whether southern African states intended to create a regional adjudication
forum that functions as the supreme court of the region, those who could not
access justice at the domestic level sought it in a regional forum. Similarly,
other individual claimants of justice would have knocked at the Tribunal for
injustices committed by Member States had it not been for the Tribunal’s
dissolution.

173 In 2007, the SADC Tribunal dealt with two cases. The first, which is not relevant for this article’s
central argument, is of African citizenry petitioning for emancipation from oppressive states and was a case
against the SADC Secretariat by its former employee. Mtingwi v. SADC Secretariat, Case No. SADC(T):
1/2007 (SADC, May 27, 2008). The second case involves a minority group of white Zimbabweans bringing a
case against the Republic of Zimbabwe against a land reform in the republic that led to a constitutional
amendment and barred minority groups from accessing the local courts to seek redress and/or challenge
constitutionality of such land reforms. Campbell v. Zimbabwe, Case No. 2/2007 (SADC(T) 2007). To the
dismay of the Zimbabwean government, the Tribunal found in favor of the applicants, however, enforcement
of the decision is yet to come. Id.
174 In this part, when the author refers to “major cases” brought before the SADC Tribunal, the emphasis
on “major” is meant to convey to the reader that the accounting of cases in this Article does not include
interlocutory appeals.
175 Article 4 is the human rights principle while Article 6 deals with non-discrimination. SADC Treaty,
supra note 2, arts. 4, 6.
176 Campbell v. Zimbabwe, Case No. 2/2007 (SADC(T) 2007).
177 Gondo v. Zimbabwe, Case No. 5/2008 (SADC(T) 2008) (discussing how residents of Zimbabwe use
SADC to request enforcement of a domestic court decision that Zimbabwe refused to enforced).
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Figure 2.6.2.3: Casual Diagrams of the Interrelationship Between Integration
and Emancipation
2. Integration-Disintegration and Emancipation
In the 1960s, integration as emancipation entailed a trajectory between a
state of colonialism and a state of decolonization. While the former state of
colonialism was oppressive, the expectation of decolonization was freedom
and liberation of the oppressed people. Logically, if integration is
emancipation, then disintegration means oppression. As Nkrumah stated,
“African states must unite” in order to end colonial oppression or else it will be
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subject to colonization.178 In the early 1960s, the importance of African unity
in its decolonization movement was clearly uncontested as the movement
sought to oppose global power dominance through its unity.179 In early years of
Africa’s independence, integration and emancipation, broadly speaking, were
directly linked. Even so, does this mean there ought to be a link between
integration and emancipation in contemporary Africa? Alternatively, if there is
regional disintegration, does it indicate a move towards a state of colonization
and/or oppression?
Mohammed Bedjaoui, an Algerian jurist and diplomat, explains the
distinction between colonization and decolonization. He categorizes
colonization as legalization of domination, exploitation, and non-egalitarian
relations, which ended, at least in theory, with advent of decolonization.180 On
the other hand, “Decolonization,” at least in its contemporary formation,
includes not only independence movements from European colonizers, but also
all forms of “oppression and resistance” paradigms that exist within and among
societies and states in contemporary Africa. These “oppression and resistance”
paradigms can help one move beyond traditional colonialism and include
struggles for social protection in a liberalized market economy, minority rights
movements and several others. Understanding these paradigms can help one
move beyond traditional colonialism and discourse. Hence, the emancipation
project of 1960s needs to carry on with it a new mandate that encompasses the
broader conception of emancipation. If emancipation encompasses different
forms of “oppression and resistance” paradigms of southern African states,
what is the role of the ongoing integration initiatives for global economic
order?
The role of integration initiatives in bringing about just economic order for
a world characterized by inequalities partly comes from the power of unity as
negotiating blocks in multilateral negotiations. Theoretically speaking, the
1970s movement for a more just economic order has created a better economic
order. However, negotiations for a more just world, specifically speaking the
third-world states’ role in setting agenda for cotton negotiations in Doha

178

Kwame Nkrumah, Speech at Casablanca Conference, Jan. 7, 1961, reprinted in 2 SELECTED SPEECHES
KWAME NKRUMAH 1, 2 (Samuel Obeng ed. 1997).
179 See id. at 1.
180 BEDJAOUI, supra note 113, at 82 (“Colonization, as a social, economic and political fact, expressed
itself in legal relations which were those of domination and exploitation . . . Decolonization, the logical
reversal of what preceded it, implies, in theory, a fundamental policy of eliminating inegalitarian links”).
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round,181 show that the struggle for party of participation is consequently
pursued by African states. Nevertheless, issues of just global economic
governance can also be raised in relation to Europe-Africa trade relations and
possible claims of the European role in disintegrating Africa. Therefore, if
ongoing Economic Partnership Agreements (“EPA”) negotiations are a
disintegrating factor for southern African integration initiatives, then
oppression will result both in terms of global governance and individual
emancipation projects. Although EPA negotiations and possible disintegration
might have been countered by the tripartite negotiations, theoretically,
disintegration should mean oppression. In reality, however, this author
understands that regional disintegration is oppression, only in the sense that it
does not give citizens an adequate forum to plea their grievances against their
home state. This lack of forum or regional guarantor of emancipation can also
happen when community institutions tolerate or favor oppressive behavior of
states over the rights of oppressed citizens. Consequently, any disintegration
that might result because of EPA’s disrupts the continental emancipation
project, in the sense that it freezes the role of community institutions as
guarantors of emancipation for the individual.
CONCLUSION
In postcolonial Africa, the integration project stemmed from a historical
context of the Pan-Africanist movement. The Pan-Africanist movement sought
integration, not for conventional justifications given as in the case of the
European Union, but for emancipatory movements against racial domination
and neo-colonization. Today, with the end of Apartheid, one wonders what
drives Africa’s integration. No doubt, conventional justifications, political and
economic benefits of integration, are legitimate causes for integration in the
continent. Yet, the existent “statistical tragedy” of the continent has led to
dubious results on whether economic benefits can be a drive for Africa’s
integration. Moreover, Kantian theory of perpetual peace, as a justification for
Africa’s integration initiatives remains controversial. Similarly, when legal
scholars assume the positive outcomes of integration initiatives and focus on
intra-disciplinary inquisition, they limit integration studies and theorizing.
Therefore, this Article theorizes the conceptual understanding of regional
integration by bridging a gap across disciplines, and making a case for the
conceptualization of integration as emancipation.
181 See generally The Cotton Initiative, WTO (Dec. 1, 2004), http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_
e/negs_bkgrnd20_cotton_e.htm.

